



Malteser

...weil Nähe zählt.



Facts, Not Feelings

Malteser Migration Report 2023

List of Abbreviations

Asylum8 states	Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria	KOK	Federal Coordination Group against Human Trafficking
AsylbLG	Asylum Seekers Benefits Act	MM19	Malteser Migration Report 2019
AZR	Central Register of Foreigners	MM21	Malteser Migration Report 2021
BA	Federal Agency for Work	OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees	PKS	Police crime statistics
BAMF-FZ	Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees	PMK	Politically motivated crime
BiB	Federal Institute for Population Research	REAG/GARP	Reintegration and Emigration Program for Asylum-Seekers in Germany / Government Assisted Repatriation Program
BKA	Federal Criminal Police Office	SOEP	Socio-Economic Panel
ELB	Beneficiaries capable of gainful employment	SGB	Social Security Code
EU	European Union	StGB	Criminal Code
EU East	Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary	SVR-Migration	Council of Experts on Integration and Immigration
EU-8 countries	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
EU-15 countries	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom	UNO	United Nations Organization
Eurostat	Statistical office of the European Union	Western Balkan states	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Serbia
FKS	Financial control of clandestine employment		
FReDA	Family demographic panel		
GG	Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany		
GRETA	Council of Europe Group of experts on action against human trafficking		
IAB	Institute for Employment Research		
ICT	Intra-corporate transfer or intra-corporate transferee (employee transferred within the company)		
IOM	International Organisation for Migration		

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Foreword

This year sees the publication of the fourth Malteser Migration Report. In publishing it, we seek to counteract the prevailing emotionally charged climate surrounding migration with facts. We are grateful to the team of the Walter Eucken Institute under the direction of Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, who has once again managed to present a politically neutral scientific review, which makes a fact-based discussion possible.

While the last report in 2021 was influenced by the global coronavirus pandemic, developments in 2022 and 2023 have been dominated by the war in Ukraine. This event has changed the political, economic and humanitarian framework worldwide, and especially in Europe.

More than a million people from Ukraine have been registered as refugees in Germany since then. Other wars or human rights violations, for example in Syria, Afghanistan or Iran, as well as the major earthquake in Turkey and Syria at the beginning of 2023, are additional reasons for flight and migration, but these have receded into the background in the media. The UNHCR estimates that more than 108.4 million people were displaced by these numerous crises at the end of 2022 – over 19 million more than at the end of 2021.

The German public has remained as willing as ever to help Ukrainian refugees. However,

numerous municipalities are sounding the alarm because they lack both accommodations capacities and financial resources. This challenge comes largely from the decision by European countries (a decision that welcome from a humanitarian perspective) to take in and care for all Ukrainian refugees as long as the war continues. In the summer of 2023, we Maltesers are also caring for more people in shelters than ever before in our history.

At the same time, this development underlines the urgent need for appropriate accommodation and integration management – not least to prevent the political mood in Germany from changing much as it did after 2015/2016. Not all challenges can be solved at the national level. This is why we are closely monitoring the efforts to reform the European asylum system. The joint decision of the European interior ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg in June 2023 marked the first milestone in this process. This decision aims to ensure that asylum seekers are granted protection under the same conditions throughout the EU going forward. It also seeks to ensure better management and a fairer distribution of asylum seekers across the EU.

The European solutions currently being discussed are giving rise to increasing warnings from politicians, refugee organisations and churches. Based on their experiences in the hotspots in Greece and Italy, they are



raising concerns about large camps at the EU's external borders, where the principles of the rule of law are being undermined, and unacceptable living conditions prevail. We share these concerns: Asylum is a human right, and keeping asylum seekers confined to overcrowded camps without access to health and legal protection, without education and without prospects for the future, is incompatible with this right. This is all the more true for children and other vulnerable persons. Our desire for a pan-European solution must not allow us to lose sight of the values that the European Union stands for.

It should not be forgotten that any obstacle to legal entry into the EU drives people fleeing war, persecution and hunger into the arms of traffickers, with all the dangers that this entails. According to the IOM, in the first half of 2023 alone, 1,875 people who wanted to reach Europe via the so-called Mediterranean route lost their lives at sea. We are baffled by the lack of media attention these people receive compared to other victims of misfortune.

We want to thank Prof. Dr. Karim Fereidooni for his instructive guest contribution to our report: The interview with the racism expert reveals that we can behave in a racist way even without racist intentions, and what makes it so difficult in our society to unlearn racism.

We all need to critically examine ourselves on a regular basis to see where we may have internalised unconscious racist assumptions that form lenses through which we view the world. As an aid organisation, we need to discard these lenses because thousands of different people encounter each other here every day and have to interact with each other as equals.

Special thanks go to the many voluntary and full-time helpers who routinely devote themselves with great dedication and without fuss to welcoming and integrating refugees.

We can only hope that peace will soon be achieved in the war and crisis zones, that there will be greater cooperation in European refugee policy and that the majority of politicians and our society will show solidarity and support for refugees.

DR. ELMAR PANKAU
Chairperson of the Executive Board,
Malteser Hilfsdienst e.V. and
Malteser Deutschland gGmbH

Content Prologue

Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine has triggered a movement of refugees that eclipses Germany's previous experience. Net immigration to Germany has not been this high since the flight and expulsion of Germans from Germany's eastern territories and from eastern and south-eastern Europe after the Second World War ended. Once again an armed conflict, this time right at the gates of the European Union (EU), has triggered this movement of refugees. And once again, the overwhelming willingness of German society to take in and welcome refugees is evident. The EU as a whole and Germany in particular have facilitated access for the integration of refugees. At the same time, the negative effects, not least the financial impact on the ground, of this migration are becoming clear.

This fourth Malteser Migration Report deals with the issue of migration in the context of this crisis.

The first chapter of the report takes stock of the migration situation, focusing on immigration from Ukraine in light of recent developments. The second chapter, as in previous migration reports, deals with integration into the labour market. The third chapter of the report once again examines the topic of crime, from the perspective of refugees as both perpetrators and victims. The fourth chapter deals with social integration. All the chapters have a special focus on refugees from Ukraine. Although this is still a recent phenomenon, interesting insights are already emerging, for example on the successful integration of Ukrainian refugees.

We hope that the fourth Malteser Migration Report will provide factual information on the topic of migration. The authors were especially keen to analyse the migration issue from a perspective that is as objective and data-based as possible.



I would like to thank the Malteser for once again collaborating so closely on the fourth migration report. Above all, I am indebted to the team of the Walter Eucken Institute, Franziska Dinter, Daniel Bamarni and Kambronbek Turgunov, and especially to Lilith Burgstaller and Amanda März. It is a tremendous pleasure to work with them.

PROF. DR. DR. H. C. LARS P. FELD,
Director of the Walter Eucken
Institute

Migration Trends – An Updated Overview





Migration Trends – An Updated Overview

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Lilith Burgstaller

A brief overview of the most important facts

- More than 108 million people were displaced worldwide in 2022. This represents an increase of 21 percent year-on-year and more than one percent of the world's population.
- About 2.67 million people immigrated to Germany in 2022. The net migration of 1.46 million people has never been this high since records began in 1950.
- The number of refugees increased by 59 percent year-on-year in 2022, meaning that there were just under 3.1 million refugees in Germany at the end of 2022. Of these, 1.1 million refugees came from Ukraine.
- As of June 2023, there were already 162,300 asylum applications in Germany. This corresponds to an increase of 67 percent compared to the previous year.
- In 2022, the Federal Government spent 28 billion euros on asylum-related benefits. Twelve billion of this was spent on combating the causes of migration.

The trend over the past ten years of increasing global migration and refugee movements persists. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees worldwide in 2022 was more than 108 million people. This represents a 21 percent increase year-on-year.¹


¹ See UNO Flüchtlingshilfe (2023). Flüchtlingszahlen – Zahlen & Fakten zu Menschen auf der Flucht, Bonn.

There was a decline in immigration to Germany, particularly in 2020 due to the pandemic-related border closures, but it increased again in 2021 and 2022. This can be observed for both general immigration and for refugees in particular. Here, the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point with far-reaching effects on migration within Europe: The movement of refugees from Ukraine is the largest on the European continent since the end of the Second World War.²

In this chapter, we outline migration developments in 2021 and 2022. Our focus is on the developments among refugees, asylum applications in Germany and asylum figures in comparison with the rest of Europe. Wherever possible, we report on the development of refugees from Ukraine together with the other groups. In addition, however, we take a separate look at the situation of Ukrainian refugees in 2022, as they represented the largest group of immigrants in that year and have a special status under residence law. Finally, we discuss the economic and fiscal aspects of asylum-related immigration in Germany.

² See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

Figure 1:
Inward and outward migration across Germany's borders



Source: The Federal Statistical Office 2023.

Migration in 2021 and 2022

In 2022, net migration in Germany was positive for the eleventh time in a row. Specifically, more than 1.46 million more people moved to Germany than left it. This means that compared to 2021, net migration increased more than fourfold and was higher in 2022 than at any time since records began in 1950.³

Around 2.67 million people moved to Germany in 2022. This is 25 percent more than in 2015 and about twice as many as in the previous year. On the other hand, 1.2 million people moved away from Germany (see Figure 1); around 22 percent


of them hold German citizenship. A considerable share of immigration to Germany in 2022 was accounted for by Ukrainian nationals (see Figure 2). Over the entire year 2022, Ukrainians account for approx. 41 percent (1.1 million people) of all inflows. In addition, 139,000 departures to Ukraine were registered in 2022 as a whole. Net immigration from Ukraine in 2022 was thus higher than that of Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi nationals as a whole in 2015.⁴

While Ukrainian nationals accounted for around 76 percent of total inflows after the outbreak of war in March 2022, this had fallen to around 21 percent by December 2022 (see Figure 2).

³ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). Population grown to 84.3 million in 2022, Wiesbaden.

⁴ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). Influx of 1.1 million people from Ukraine in 2022, Wiesbaden.

Figure 2:
Inward and outward migration across Germany's borders in the months January 2020 to March 2023



Sources: Federal Statistical Office 2022, Federal Statistical Office 2023.

ABOUT

2.67 mil.

PEOPLE MOVED TO GERMANY IN 2022.

IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH TO MAY 2022

744,400

PEOPLE FLED FROM UKRAINE TO GERMANY.

1.46 mil.

PEOPLE COMPRISED NET MIGRATION
 IN GERMANY IN 2022.

Net immigration from EU member states decreased for the second year in a row in 2022, amounting to just under 24,100 people (-14% year-on-year). Net immigration from third countries exceeded internal EU migration by a factor of almost sixty and amounted to 1.44 million people. Besides Ukraine, Romania and Syria were the countries with the highest net migration, as in previous years (see Figure 3). However, they accounted for a much smaller share of the total numbers in 2022 than in previous years. Net immigration from Romania decreased slightly in 2022 compared to the previous year and now amounted to 39,200 people. On the other hand, net immigration from Syria rose by around 63 percent year-on-year to 78,900 people.

24,100


THE EU'S INTERNAL MIGRATION NUMBERS IN 2022 WERE AT THEIR LOWEST SINCE 2009.

APPROX

60 times

HIGHER THAN EU INTERNAL MIGRATION IN 2022 IMMIGRATION FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.


Figure 3:
Net migration according to immigration groups



Note: Romania and Syria represented the main countries of origin of the respective group in the years 2015 to 2022.

Source: Federal Statistical Office 2023; own presentation.

Figure 4:
Population with and without a migration background in 2022



Note: A person has a migration background if either they or at least one parent does not have German citizenship by birth. A person has their own migration experience if they were born abroad and immigrated to Germany. "Without own migration experience" means that the person was born in Germany. The population in private households as a whole differs slightly from other statistics with 83.1 million people in the microcensus.

Source: Microcensus of the Federal Statistical Office 2023.

Population with migration background and sociodemographics of refugees

According to the Microcensus, the population in Germany will have risen to 83.1 million people in 2022. This corresponds to a growth of just under two percent compared to the reporting year 2019 and a growth of around one percent compared to the previous year.⁵ People with a migration background accounted for just under 29 percent of the population. This corresponds to an increase of just under two percentage points year-on-year.⁶ Compared to 2021, the proportion of German nationals with a migration background who were already born in Germany (29%) and the proportion of people who have no migration experience of their own (22%) fell slightly. The proportion of foreigners who have experienced migration themselves out of the total number of people with a migration background in Germany rose by almost two percentage points compared to the previous year. They now account for just under 42 percent of all people with a migration background in Germany (see Figure 4). Only seven percent of people with a migration background in Germany have foreign citizenship and no migration experience of their own.

Since the reporting year 2022, the Federal Statistical Office has alternatively recorded and reported the population with a history of immigration. The Office follows a suggestion of the Federal Government's expert commission regarding the conditions for integration and harmonizes the definition with other definitions used internationally. Whereas a person is deemed to have a migration background if one of their parents was not born with German citizenship, both parents must have immigrated to Germany after 1950 in order to have a history of immigration.⁷

⁵ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). Germany's population grown by 1.3 % in 2022, Wiesbaden.

⁶ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). 24.3 percent of the population had an immigration history in 2022, Wiesbaden.

⁷ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). History of immigration – Background paper, Wiesbaden.


Compared to almost 24 million people with a migration background, around 20 million people with a history of immigration lived in Germany in 2022. Measured in terms of the total population, their share increased by about one percentage point to around 24 percent compared to the previous year. Almost 76 percent of this group are people who immigrated to Germany themselves after 1950. The number of direct immigrants rose by around seven percent compared to the previous year, which can be attributed to the high level of refugee migration from Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. The number of non-direct immigrants with a history of immigration rose by just under four percent at the same time. The main countries of origin of people with a history

of immigration since 2013 are Syria (16%), followed by Romania (7%) and Poland (6%). In the same period, the most represented reasons for immigration to Germany were flight (28%) and employment (24%).⁸

This section focuses on refugees, who represent a subgroup of people with a migration background in Germany. Refugees are people who have come to Germany for humanitarian reasons, reasons of international law or political reasons and seek protection from persecution or threats to their

⁸ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). 24.3 percent of the population had an immigration history in 2022, Wiesbaden.


Figure 5:
Refugee trends in Germany



Note: The number of people from the asylum⁸ states is highlighted and relates to the cut-off date of December 31, 2022.

Source: Federal Statistical Office 2023; own presentation.

Figure 6:
Age structure of refugees compared to the total population and the foreign population in Germany in 2022



Note: For ease of comparison, the number of people refers to 100 people in each group (e.g. female refugees), so the shares should be interpreted as a percentage of the respective group. The number of refugees applies to the cut-off date of December 31, 2022. The foreign population is defined as people who are not just temporarily living in Germany (three months or longer) and who do not have German citizenship.

Source: The Federal Statistical Office 2023.

lives, for example, because of their race⁹, religion or nationality. People whose asylum application that has been granted or rejected are included, as are people who are undergoing the asylum procedure.¹⁰ The number of refugees in Germany increased substantially in 2022 compared to the previous year by 59 percent to just under 3.1 million people from 1.14 million. Around 89,300 refugees came to Germany from the asylum8 states (main countries of origin) in 2022. The largest group is made up of Ukrainian nationals, of whom around 1.01 million were in Germany at the end of 2022. They accounted for just under 33 percent of all refugees in Germany in 2022. Overall, refugees make up just under four percent of the total population, an increase of two percentage points compared to the previous year.

At 46 percent, people from the asylum8 states thus represent a significantly smaller share of all refugees than in previous years (2021: 68%). In 2022, the number of people from the asylum8 states increased by almost seven percent or about 89,300 people compared to the previous year (see Figure 5). The biggest change in this group was seen in people with Afghan citizenship, whose number increased by around 16 percent compared to the previous year. This development should be viewed in the context of the Taliban coming to power in August 2021, which caused an extreme humanitarian crisis.¹¹ Among nationals from the main asylum countries of origin, people with Syrian citizenship continued to form the largest group of refugees in Germany with around 674,100 people (+5% compared to the previous year).

Figure 6 shows how the foreign population, especially refugees, differs in its demographic characteristics from the population as a whole. The foreign population in general, as well as refugees in particular, are significantly younger

⁹ The term race is used in reference to the Geneva Refugee Convention (see MM19).

¹⁰ See Federal Statistics Office (2023). Refugees, Wiesbaden.

¹¹ See Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2023). Afghanistan, Berlin.

than the general population. While the 35 to 65 year-olds make up the largest share of the general population as well as of the foreign population, the group of refugees is significantly younger. In 2022, just under 21 percent of the general population were older than 65. In the group of foreigners in general, the figure was only around eight percent, and just under five percent among refugees. While the demographics of foreigners in general have not changed much in terms of age or gender distribution, both distributions have shifted considerably in the group of refu-

gees. While the proportion of men in the refugee population was still just under 61 percent in 2021, it had fallen to just under 47 percent in 2022. At the same time, the proportion of people aged between 18 and 34 years fell from just under 37 percent to just under 32 percent. Both developments can probably be attributed to the large number of refugees from Ukraine, where women account for almost 64 percent. In addition, the age groups of 35 to 65 years and those older than 65 are more strongly represented among them than among Syrian or Iraqi refugees, for example.

THERE WAS A **59%**
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER
OF REFUGEES IN GERMANY IN 2022
COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

AROUND **3.1 mil.**
REFUGEES WERE IN GERMANY AT THE END OF 2022.

AROUND **33%**
OF ALL REFUGEES IN GERMANY
AT THE END OF 2022 WERE
UKRAINIAN NATIONALS.

Reform of the Residence Act for refugees

On January 1, 2022, the Opportunity Residence Act came into force. This created a number of changes in the right to stay for refugees and especially for tolerated refugees. The practice of chain toleration was abolished. Chain toleration meant that refugees had to renew their toleration several times a year and only had limited access to the labour market. The Opportunity Residence Act grants people who have been tolerated for at least five years (or who have been granted another residence status in the meantime but are currently tolerated) a residence title for 18 months. This also applies to members of the nuclear family living in the same flat, even if they have not yet been in Germany for five years. Refugees can use this period to find a job that will allow them to support themselves independently. They must also be able to prove that they have a good command of German and that their identity has been clarified. If this is the case, they can be granted permanent residence after 18 months. As of December 31, 2022, there were around 137,400 refugees in Germany who had been tolerated for more than five years. The law also reforms the right to stay regulations for well-integrated people who are not older than 27.¹² They can obtain permanent residence after only three years. Furthermore, all refugees undergoing asylum procedures will be granted access to integration courses.¹³

12 For example, people under 27 are considered to be well integrated if they have attended school in Germany for at least three years (Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior, for Sport and Integration (2023). Entry into force of the Opportunity Residence Act and related legal amendments; information for the immigration authorities, Munich).

13 See Federal Ministry of the Interior and for Home Affairs (2022). Law on the Introduction of an Opportunity Residence Act, Berlin.

Development of asylum applications in Germany since 2016

The number of asylum applications in Germany fell significantly between 2016 and 2021. This development could mainly be attributed to a decline in refugee migration as well as restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁴ However, in the second half of 2022, the number of asylum applications rose significantly above the level of previous years (see Figure 7). In 2022, a total of 244,100 asylum applications were made, of which around 217,800 were first-time applications. This corresponds to an increase of 47 percent in the number of first-time applications compared to the previous year. The largest share of first-time applications in 2022 was filed by refugees from Syria (about 33%). The number of first-time applications by people from Afghanistan rose by 56 percent compared to the previous year to just under 36,400 people. Nigeria is no longer among the top ten countries of origin. In 2022, 73 percent of those applying for asylum were younger than 30. The proportion of males submitting a first-time application was around 68 percent.¹⁵

14 See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2022). The Federal Office in figures in 2021, Nuremberg.

15 See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2023). Current figures. December 2022, Nuremberg.

47%

INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FIRST-TIME ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN 2022 COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

At the editorial deadline, the asylum application figures and decisions for 2023 are available up to and including June. The comparatively high number of applications in 2022 did not decrease in the first months of 2023: A total of 162,300 asylum applications were filed up to and including June 2023. This corresponds to an increase of 67 percent compared to the previous year.


In total, just under 228,700 asylum decisions were made in 2022. The proportion of successful applications can be expressed as the total protection rate and the adjusted protection rate. Formal decisions are included in the overall protection rate. These are asylum applications that the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) does not process in substance, for example because an asylum application is withdrawn or it is determined that another EU member state is responsible for conducting the asylum procedure.

This overall protection rate was just under 56 percent in 2022, significantly higher than the previous years' figures of 43 percent in 2020 and 40 percent in 2021. Deducting the other procedural resolutions yields the adjusted protection rate, which only includes the applications that the BAMF actually examines in terms of content. In 2022, this rate was 72 percent, nine percentage points higher than in 2021. The adjusted protection rate in 2022 for asylum applications of Syrian nationals was only slightly below 100 percent. In 2022, Afghan nationals were granted protection status in 99 percent of cases, not taking into account formal decisions.¹⁶

If a refugee comes to Germany, there are generally four forms of protection that can be granted to them if their application is accepted (entitlement

¹⁶ See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2023). The Federal Office in figures in 2022, Nuremberg.

Figure 7:
Development of asylum applications and asylum decisions (initial and subsequent applications) from January 2016 until June 2023



Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2023.

to asylum, refugee protection, subsidiary protection, deportation prohibition). Furthermore, applications can be rejected or formal decisions can be made.¹⁷ Since the status that a refugee receives depends largely on the circumstances in the country of origin, the legal status granted to people differs according to their nationality. About 70 percent of all Eritrean refugees were granted refugee status under the Geneva Convention in 2022, making up the largest proportion of those with refugee status (see Figure 8). The second highest proportion is Somali nationals: 44 percent of them were granted refugee status in 2022. Syrian nationals were granted refugee status in 20 percent of cases in 2022, and subsidiary protection in 70 percent of cases. In the case of subsidiary protection, refugees are only entitled to family reunification under special conditions (unlike refugee status, see MM19). Another de-

17 For a detailed explanation of the different protection statuses, please refer to MM19.

velopment is the increase in deportation prohibitions for Afghan refugees. In 2022, 60 percent of all refugees with Afghan citizenship were granted a deportation prohibition. While 15 percent of all Afghan refugees were rejected in 2021 (2020: 26%), this only applied to just under one percent or 260 people in 2022. Around 24 percent of refugees from Turkey were granted refugee status in 2022, while 51 percent were rejected.

In 2022, a total of about 12,900 people were deported from Germany (+8% compared to the previous year). The largest share of those deported in 2022 had citizenship from one of the countries of the Western Balkans (just under 3,200 people, see Figure 9). Around 950 people were deported to Georgia and 730 people to Afghanistan. In 2023, around 7,900 people left Germany with financial assistance from the REAG/GARP program.¹⁸ This means that the number of people who took advantage of this assistance increased by 16 percent compared to the reporting year 2021. The REAG/GARP program provides financial assistance for refugees to return or continue their journey.¹⁹ Voluntary departure under the REAG/GARP program could not be implemented as usual in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

70%

OF REFUGEES WITH ERITREAN NATIONALITY
WERE GRANTED REFUGEE PROTECTION
UNDER THE GENEVA REFUGEE CONVENTION IN 2022.


1%

OF ALL REFUGEES WITH AFGHAN CITIZENSHIP
WERE REJECTED IN 2022.

18 See printed papers of the German Bundestag 20/890, 20/5795.

19 See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2022). Voluntary return, Nuremberg.

Figure 8:
Decisions on asylum applications for the asylum8 states and Turkey in the full year 2022




Note: "Formal decisions" are procedures where the asylum application is not substantively examined due to applicants withdrawing their applications or where another EU Member State is responsible (Dublin III Regulation). Values below four percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2023.

AROUND **12,900**
PEOPLE WERE DEPORTED FROM GERMANY IN 2022.

8%
INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF DEPORTATIONS
COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

Figure 9:
Deportations according to nationality



Sources: Printed Papers of the German Bundestag 18/4025, 18/7588, 18/11112, 19/800, 19/8021, 19/18201, 19/27007, 20/890, 20/5795.

Asylum seekers in Europe

In 2022, just under 965,700 people, almost 92 percent of whom were first-time applicants, applied for asylum in the EU. The number of asylum applications thus increased by 64 percent compared to the previous year. According to the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), there were around 3.8 million refugees from third countries in the EU at the end of 2022 who held a residence permit granting them temporary protection. As in previous years, Syrian nationals accounted for the largest share of applicants in 2022 (15% of all asylum applications), followed by Afghan nationals (13% of all asylum applications).²⁰

In terms of population, the highest number of asylum applications in 2022 was in Cyprus, with just under 25 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants. In 2021, the figure had been 15 asylum applications per 1,000 people. Austria is in second place with just under 13 asylum applications

20 See Eurostat (2023). First-time asylum applicants up 64% in 2022, Luxembourg.

WITH **25**

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS PER 1,000 INHABITANTS, CYPRUS RECEIVED THE MOST ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN 2022 RELATIVE TO THE POPULATION IN A EUROPEAN COMPARISON.

A quarter

OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE EU SUBMITTED THEIR APPLICATION IN GERMANY.

per 1,000 inhabitants, which is almost three times as many as in the previous year. In Hungary, 0.0046 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants were filed in 2022; the number was only slightly lower in 2021.²¹ Germany ranked tenth in 2022 (fifth in 2021) with just under three asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants (see Figure 10). In absolute numbers, a quarter of all asylum seekers (around 217,700 people) in Europe applied for asylum in Germany. Around three quarters of all asylum seekers in Europe filed their asylum application in Germany, France, Spain, Austria and Italy.²²

On 14 June 2023, one of the most deadly shipwrecks involving refugees in recent years occurred in the Mediterranean Sea.²³ A boat on which between 400 and 750 people were making their way to Europe capsized off the coast of Greece. While 104 people were rescued, 78 bodies were recovered. The remaining passengers most likely did not survive the accident. The situation on the Mediterranean Sea remains precarious. In 2022, just under 159,400 people reached Europe via the Mediterranean route. This corresponds to an increase of around 29 percent compared to the previous year. Around 2,400 people (3,200 people in the previous year) died or were reported missing by sea.²⁴ A shift in flight routes has become apparent since the publication of the last Malteser Migration Report (MM21). For example, the number of refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Libya increased by

21 According to Hungarian asylum law, asylum seekers must submit a declaration of intent to a Hungarian mission abroad before entering the country. This application must be granted at the respective mission abroad, and only then are refugees allowed to enter the country. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently found this approach to be inconsistent with the EU Directive on the common granting and withdrawal of international protection (Court of Justice of the European Union (2023). Press release no. 109/23).

22 See Eurostat (2023). First-time asylum applicants up 64% in 2022, Luxembourg.

23 See International Organization for Migration (2023). IOM and UNHCR Call for Decisive Action Following Mediterranean Tragedy

24 See Operational Data Portal (UNHCR) (2023). Mediterranean Situation, Geneva.

150 percent and from Tunisia by 61 percent in 2021. The UN Refugee Agency attributes this to overcrowded reception camps on the Greek islands, among other things.

The Libyan coast guard is tasked with and supported by the EU in intercepting refugees in the Mediterranean and returning them to Libya. In the first six months of 2021 alone, 14,000 people were intercepted on the Mediterranean and taken to Libya, where the human rights situation is very grim. According to information from UN Refugee Agency, as of June 2021, around 1,000 refugees were detained in detention camps in Libya, where they were subjected to human rights violations. Reports included lack of sanitation and medical care, as well as ill-treatment.²⁵

The United Nations Human Rights Council presented the report of an independent commission on the human rights situation in Libya in March 2023. More than 400 interviews were conducted with victims of Libyan institutions and witnesses, and other materials such as video recordings and meeting recordings were analysed. The commission found evidence of crimes against humanity committed by Libyan state bodies such as the Libyan coast guard. More than 100 immigrants interviewed reported murder, torture and sexual violence, among other issues.²⁶ Libya has received financial support from the EU totalling €700 million since 2015.²⁷ Among other things, this will be used to train the Libyan coast guard and supply them with equipment. The aim is to prevent smuggling and human trafficking and to carry out rescue operations at sea.²⁸


25 See UN Refugee Assistance (2022). Refugees in Libya – Living in a "Failed State", Bonn.

26 See Human Rights Council of the United Nations (2023). Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, New York City.

27 See European Council (2023). Infographic – Migration flows: EU measures for Libya, Brussels.

28 See European Council (2023). Migration Flows on the Central Mediterranean Route, Brussels.

Figure 10:
Asylum applications submitted per 1,000 inhabitants in a European comparison



Note: This is a selection of European countries. The asylum application figures include first-time and subsequent applications.

Source: Eurostat 2023; own calculations; own presentation.

The reform of the common European asylum system

The EU has been in the process of reforming asylum law since 2020. The aim is to harmonize the treatment of refugees in Europe to reduce the incentive to apply for asylum in the country with the highest protection rates.²⁹ The European Council agreed on rules on asylum procedures at the EU's external borders in early June 2023. Among other things, people from third countries with a recognition rate of less than 20 percent ("safe third countries") are to be given an asylum procedure at the EU's external borders. The same applies to people whose identity has not been clarified. The specific interpretation of the return to third countries is the responsibility of the respective EU member states at whose external borders asylum procedures are carried out.³⁰ A total capacity of 30,000 places at the EU's external borders is to be set up for the procedures and the processing of these cases must not take longer than six months. The new rules are intended to replace the current Dublin rules. A solidarity mechanism allows EU member states to decide whether to take in refugees or pay financial compensation to the receiving countries of 20,000 euros per acceptance.³¹ The current proposal is currently being critically discussed by politicians and various associations, among others. The European Parliament must give its consent before the European Council's proposal can enter into force.

29 See European Council (2023). Reform of the EU asylum system, Brussels.

30 See Tagesschau (2023). Schnelle „Grenzverfahren“ auch für Syrer möglich, Hamburg.

31 See European Council (2023). Migration policy: Council reaches agreement on key asylum and migration laws, Brussels.

ABOUT **2,440**
PEOPLE DIED OR WERE REPORTED MISSING
ON THE MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE
EN ROUTE TO EUROPE IN 2022.

Impact of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine

According to UNHCR, around 6.3 million Ukrainians were displaced at the beginning of July 2023. At the end of 2022, this number was still around eight million people.³² According to UNHCR data, Russia is the country that receives the most people from Ukraine; as of December 2023, there were almost 1.3 million Ukrainian people in Russia. According to reports by the UNHCR, it can be assumed that the majority of these people were brought to Russia against their will and therefore cannot be described as refugees in the proper sense.³³ The extent to which these forced resettlements have taken place so far has not been fully clarified. While the Ukrainian government estimated in May 2022 that around 1.2 million people had been trafficked (including 200,000 children), the US ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mentioned tens of thousands of people.³⁴ In July 2022, the US State Department issued a press release estimating that between 900,000 and 1.6 million people had been interrogated, detained and deported. Among them, 260,000 are said to have been children.³⁵

There were around 1.08 million Ukrainian refugees in Germany in July 2023. In Poland, around 999,700 Ukrainian refugees were registered at the same time. This is followed by the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom as well as Spain and Italy, where, however, significantly fewer people were staying (see Figure 11).

32 See UNHCR (2022). Ukraine Refugee Situation, Geneva. Note: We are reporting on the data situation as of January 2, 2023 and July 7, 2023 respectively.

33 See Politico (2022). Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians forced to Russia, U.S. claims, Arlington; European Parliament (2022). Resolution on human rights violations in the context of the forced deportation of Ukrainian civilians to and the forced adoption of Ukrainian children in Russia, Brüssel.

34 See ZDF heute (2022). USA: Tausende Ukrainer nach Russland gebracht, Mainz.

35 See U.S. Department of State (2022). Russia's "Filtration" Operations, Forced Disappearances and Mass Deportations of Ukrainian Citizens, Washington, D.C..

The residence status of Ukrainian refugees is noteworthy. On 4 March 2022, just a few days after the start of the war on 24 February, EU interior ministers called for the implementation of the mass influx directive. Under this, refugees from Ukraine are allowed to stay in European countries without having to apply for asylum. This form of residence permit allows refugees to be admitted quickly and without red tape (see box on page 28).


Representative survey data from the IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey provide initial insights into the socio-demographic and socio-economic structure as well as the intentions of refugees from Ukraine to stay. At the time of the

survey from August to October 2022, 76 percent of refugees already had a residence permit; 18 percent held a de facto certificate, which is issued until the residence title is granted.³⁶ The demographic characteristics of the Ukrainian refugee population in Germany differ significantly from those of refugees from other countries of origin. As described above, females are disproportionately represented in the group of refugees from Ukraine compared to other refugees. Among the 18- to 65-year-old refugees, 80 percent are female.³⁷ This is partly due to the fact that the male

36 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

37 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

Figure 11:
Countries in which Ukrainian refugees arrived.



Note: These are the numbers of documented refugees in each case. The number of people already registered with the authorities and receiving state aid differs in the case of Italy and Russia. It should be noted that countries report their figures at different times. Thus, all countries except Russia made their last report in June. The last report from Russia is dated December 31, 2022.

** Ukrainian people staying in Russia cannot be called refugees in the strict sense of the word, as most of them were brought to Russia against their will.*

Source: UNHCR (2023); own presentation.

population between the ages of 18 and 65 has not been allowed to leave Ukraine since a general mobilization on 25 February 2022.³⁸

It is also striking that Ukrainian refugees in Germany have an above-average number of tertiary education qualifications (university degree or comparable). This can be seen both in compari-

38 See Tagesschau (2022). Ukraine ordnet allgemeine Mobilmachung an, Hamburg.


son to the entire Ukrainian population and in comparison to the German population. 72 percent of Ukrainian refugees had this type of educational qualification. This means that there are relatively fewer qualifications from primary, secondary or vocational education (see Figure 12). 18 percent of Ukrainian refugees have a primary or secondary educational qualification, and eleven percent have a vocational qualification. This means that there are fewer Ukrainian refugees with these qualifications than in the general Ukrainian population.³⁹

Since mid-March, the "Königstein Key" has been in effect for the distribution of Ukrainian refugees in Germany, stipulating how many refugees a federal state must take in. Ukrainian refugees are predominantly housed in pri-

39 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

80%
OF THE UKRAINIAN REFUGEE
POPULATION IN GERMANY
AGED BETWEEN 18 AND 65
IS FEMALE.

Figure 12:
Educational and vocational qualifications of refugees from Ukraine compared to the Ukrainian and German population



Note: The shares refer to the 20- to 70-year-old population in each case. Illustration based on Brücker et al. 2022.


Source: IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey, Brücker et al. 2022.

vate accommodation (74% of refugees), with only nine percent living in collective accommodation. The remaining 17 percent were staying in guesthouses or hotels at the time of the survey. Of those in private accommodation, 26 percent say they have moved in with family or acquaintances, and 15 percent have moved in with other people.⁴⁰

A heterogeneous picture emerges regarding refugee's intentions to stay. 34 percent of refugees intend to leave Germany again after the end of the war, while 37 percent say they intend to stay in Germany for several years (11%) or for good (26%). Of the 34 percent who intend to stay in Germany until the end of the war, 81 percent say they want to return to Ukraine. Around 27 percent of refugees are not yet able to express an intention due to the uncertain course of the war (see Figure 13).⁴¹

It can be concluded that the situation of Ukrainian refugees differs from those of other nationals. According to the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the implementation of the Mass Influx Directive will improve integration opportunities (see box on page 28). This is particularly the case thanks to legal certainty, which gives employers and refugees alike an incentive to invest in human capital. The incentive to invest in language skills or further education, for example, is significantly higher if the possibility of staying in Germany is assured.⁴²

Figure 13:
Intentions of Ukrainian refugees to stay



Source: IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey, Brücker et al. 2022; own presentation.

26%

OF THE UKRAINIAN REFUGEE
POPULATION INTEND TO STAY
IN GERMANY FOR GOOD.

40 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

41 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

42 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Eine Einschätzung der Integrationschancen, Nuremberg.

The Mass Influx Directive

The aim of the directive is to grant temporary residence status to displaced people from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin. This is to prevent the asylum system from becoming overburdened and also to allow quicker clarification of residence statuses. This status can be granted to all Ukrainian nationals as well as stateless people and nationals of third countries who had international protection status in Ukraine.

The directive allows for a residence permit to be issued without any red tape for an initial period of one year. This can be extended up to twice for a total of three years.⁴³ The Directive stipulates that refugees are entitled to engage in employed or self-employed activities. They also get direct access to education and are entitled to medical care. While Ukrainian refugees received benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) under this residence status at the beginning of the war, in April 2022 the Federal Government decided to grant them entitlement to benefits under the Social Code II.⁴⁴ They are thus treated the same as recognized refugees when it comes to receiving benefits. In the asylum system, refugees whose residence title has not yet been approved only receive benefits under the AsylbLG. These are below the minimum income level.

43 See Council of the European Union (2001). Directive 2001/55/EG, Brussels.

44 See Federal Government (2022). Meeting of the Federal Chancellor with the Heads of Government of the states on April 7, 2022, Berlin.

NEARLY **12 bil.**
EUROS WERE SPENT BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN 2022 ON COMBATING
THE CAUSES OF FLIGHT.

Economic and fiscal aspects of asylum-related immigration since 2020


Just under EUR 22 billion of total federal expenditure went to asylum-related benefits in 2021, a slight reduction compared to the previous year. Most of this decrease is due to the lower relief for the states (-0.9 billion euros compared to the previous year). As in previous years, the highest share of asylum-related benefits went to fighting the causes of flight (almost EUR 10 billion) and, to a lesser extent, to social transfer payments (around EUR 5 billion).

Although the final figures on federal asylum-related benefits are not yet available as part of the 2022 financial plan, the federal government has already provided information on expenditure related to flight and migration for this year. In total, these benefits amounted to EUR 28 billion and were thus significantly higher than the planned expenditure of around EUR 22 billion (see Figure 14). Of this, around EUR 12 billion went to fighting the causes of flight. States and municipalities were provided with a total of around EUR 15 billion. Due to the responsibility of the job centres for refugees from Ukraine (see Chapter 2), social benefits for refugees from Ukraine fall under the financial responsibility of the federal government, which takes over benefits under the Citizen's Income Scheme. In 2022, federal social benefits for refugees from Ukraine amounted to around EUR 3 billion. Around EUR 5 billion were accrued in social benefits for refugees of other nationalities.⁴⁵

The planning of the German Bundestag will probably not be able to keep up with the developments of the current year 2023. Municipalities are increasingly reporting that they are reaching the limits of their capacity due to the renewed sharp rise in the number of refugees (see Figure 7). The German Association of Cities is voicing concerns about a lack of housing, daycare and

45 See printed matter of the German Bundestag 20/6850.

Figure 14:
Asylum-related benefits provided by the federal government (in billion of euros)



Note: The statement is a target value for 2022, the draft for 2023 and the financial plan for 2024. Only values above EUR 0.5 billion are labelled.

Sources: Printed Papers of the German Bundestag 19/22601, 19/31501, 20/3101; own presentation.

school places. There is also a shortage of municipal staff. These circumstances would make it more difficult to integrate the refugees.⁴⁶ Kühn and Schlicht (2023) report survey results among municipalities, 69 percent of which state that the situation in their municipality is "barely manageable". According to the report, 17 percent of the municipalities were already working "over the limit".⁴⁷ In the wake of this, municipal umbrella organizations are increasingly demanding finan-

cial support from the federal government.⁴⁸ Chancellor Olaf Scholz convened a migration summit at the beginning of May to coordinate the federal government's needs and funding options. The Minister Presidents of the states called for a return to the four-pillar model, under which the federal government paid per capita lump sums for refugees as well as integration costs. Housing costs and costs for unaccompanied minors were also covered. This breathing system could adapt better to the current numbers of refugees than the current equalization system between the federal and state governments.⁴⁹ At the migration summit in May this year, the

⁴⁶ See Deutscher Städtetag (2023). Reception and care of refugees, Berlin.

⁴⁷ When interpreting these survey results, bear in mind that it is unclear which person within a municipality is answering the survey questionnaire and that the results may be influenced by the (political) goals of the person answering. Furthermore, the response rate among the 401 municipalities contacted was just under 50 percent. A non-random response to the questionnaire can additionally influence the results of the survey.

⁴⁸ See Kühn and Schlicht (2023). Kommunale Unterbringung von Geflüchteten – Probleme und Lösungsansätze, Berlin.

⁴⁹ See Conference of the Heads of Government of the states on March 16, 2023 in Berlin. Decision, Berlin.

Federal Government and the states were able to agree on a one-off payment of one billion euros from the Federal Government to the states. Further decisions on the restructuring of federal compensation payments to the states will be negotiated in November.⁵⁰

Asylum seekers and tolerated people receive financial support from the AsylbLG. These vary with the living situation, marital status and age of the refugee. In this context, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that a reduction in benefits due to accommodation in collective housing violates the basic right to be guaranteed a minimum


subsistence level in human dignity.⁵¹ The benefits have already been slightly increased for 2021 compared to 2020. They amounted to EUR 364 per month for a single person in 2021 (EUR 351 in the previous year). In 2022, the benefits amounted to a total of EUR 367. Benefits have increased to EUR 410 in 2023 in response to significantly higher inflation rates in 2022.⁵² However, the benefits for asylum seekers did not catch up with the benefits from SGB II (unemployment benefit 2) with the introduction of the citizen's income.

50 See Federal Government (2023). Meeting of the Federal Chancellor with the Heads of Government of the states on May 10, 2023. Resolution, Berlin.

51 See BVerfG, Decision of the First Senate of October 19, 2022 – 1BvL 3/21-, Marginal 1–99, Karlsruhe.

52 See Federal Law Gazette Volume 2022 Part I No. 54.

Figure 15:
Gross expenditure (in billions of euros, left scale) and beneficiaries (in millions, right scale) under the AsylbLG



Note: Recipients of asylum seeker benefits are reported as of 31 December of each year. Special benefits mainly represent health and care services. Due to various reporting problems in 2020 and 2021, there is a slight under-reporting in the number of benefit recipients.

Sources: Federal Statistical Office 2022, Federal Statistical Office 2023.

The amount of expenditure from the AsylbLG remained at a stable level of around EUR 4 billion in 2021 from 2019 to 2021 (see Figure 15). This corresponds to an increase of only two percent compared to the previous year. Almost 45 percent of the benefits are basic benefits, while 34 percent are subsistence assistance. Thus, the relative shares have remained stable over the past four years. The number of benefit recipients had fallen slightly in 2020 but increased again slightly by 23,400 people in 2021. This means that in 2021 there were just under 398,600 people receiving benefits under the AsylbLG.

Like the total benefits under the AsylbLG, their distribution among the various claimant groups in 2021 has remained relatively consistent compared to the previous year. Around 66 percent (-2% compared to the previous year) of all benefits were paid to people or their family members who were undergoing an active asylum procedure. The second largest claimant group was tolerated people, who accounted for 24 percent (-1% compared to the previous year) of claimants. The smallest share was accounted for by people who were obliged to leave the country (4%).

4%

OF THE BENEFITS FROM THE ASYLbLG IN 2021 WENT TO PEOPLE WHO ARE OBLIGED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

410

EUROS ARE THE MONTHLY BENEFITS FROM THE ASYLbLG FOR A SINGLE PERSON IN 2023.

4 bil.

AROUND 4 bil. EUROS WAS THE EXPENDITURE FROM THE ASYLbLG IN 2021. THEY HAVE THUS REMAINED STABLE SINCE 2019.

15 bil.

AROUND 15 bil. EUROS WENT TO THE MUNICIPALITIES IN 2023.



Labour Market – The Influence of Migration



Labour Market – The Influence of Migration

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld und Lilith Burgstaller

A brief overview of the most important facts

- The increase in employment in the German labour market in 2022 can be entirely attributed to the foreign population. 407,000 people in this group found employment in 2022.
- Despite the high net migration to Germany and, in particular, the increase in the number of refugees, employment rates among all foreigners and in most subgroups have remained constant or are showing slight growth. Among German nationals, on the other hand, the employment rate at the end of 2022 is declining year-on-year.
- The employment rate among Ukrainian nationals was 18 percent in April 2023. Compared to other refugees, they are more highly educated than average and almost as likely to be employed in expert jobs as German nationals.
- At the end of June 2022, about 416,000 people from third countries were in Germany with a residence permit for gainful employment migration. That was 15 percent more than in 2021.
- The regulations on gainful employment migration were revised by the German government in the first half of 2023. In the future, qualification, experience and potential will be assessed independently of each other in deciding whether a person can come to Germany for employment.

After recording slightly negative growth for the second time in succession in the first quarter of 2023, the German economy was in a state of technical recession at the time this report went to press. This development is now having an impact on the labour market. Seasonally adjusted, unemployment and underemployment increased. These increases are evident even discounting Ukrainian refugees, and are thus an indication of a cyclical slowdown on the labour market. In addition, the number of reported vacancies is currently declining. However, due to the increase in vacancies in recent years, the number remains high.⁵³ Employment subject to social insurance contributions is unchanged year-on-year, but it is declining among German nationals. The fact that it is unchanged from the previous year in total can thus be attributed to employment gains among the foreign population.⁵⁴

This chapter sets out how current migration trends are affecting the labour market and how well immigrants are integrating into the labour market. We show developments for German nationals as well as foreign nationals, depending on data availability. In addition, we list specific groups of foreign nationals, such as nationals from one of the asylum8 states or Ukraine, up to April 2023, depending on data availability.

⁵³ See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Monthly report on the labour and training market. June 2023, Nuremberg.

⁵⁴ See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Monthly report on the labour and training market. April 2023, Nuremberg.

We first focus on current employment developments and separately address labour migration from third countries by highlighting developments under the Western Balkans regulation as well as the Skilled Workers Immigration Act. We also discuss the role of discrimination in the German employment market. We then look at current developments in start-up activity and on the training market and describe the dynamics in unemployment statistics. We address the role of Ukrainian refugees at the appropriate points and conclude the chapter with a section that focuses on this group in particular. Among other things, we use the current and informative data from the IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey (see box).

The employment trend since 2021

Prior to Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022, employment subject to social insurance contributions had been recovering from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2021. Employment growth had reached year-end 2018 levels in February 2022, when the labour market was again weakened by the aftermath of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine. At the start of 2023, employment growth was then on a similar scale to what it had been at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently, around 34.7 million people in Germany are in employment subject to social security contributions (as of: April 2023). This represents a year-on-year increase of just under one percent. As before the pandemic, people from the countries of the Western Balkans, the EU eastward expansion and the asylum⁸ states contributed strongly to the increase in employment; in addition, refugees from Ukraine have played a significant role since April 2022. All in all, the increase in employment can be attributed to the foreign population.⁵⁵ In April 2023, about 5.2 million of

407,000

FOREIGN-BORN INDIVIDUALS FOUND EMPLOYMENT IN 2022, ACCOUNTING FOR ALL OF THE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET.

all people in employment subject to social insurance contributions were foreigners, which corresponds to just under 15 percent of the total workforce. People from the countries in the EU eastward expansion make up the largest group of these, with around 1.7 million people. The number of employed people from the Western Balkan countries amounted to about 465,600 people in April 2023.

In January 2023, employment in the German population decreased year-on-year for the first time since March 2021. Specifically, about 37,500 fewer German nationals were in employment subject to social insurance contributions at that time than a year earlier. This trend is solidifying: In April 2023, just under 71,700 fewer German nationals were in employment subject to social insurance contributions than a year earlier. The Federal Employment Agency (BA) attributes these effects to the demographic development and notes that not even an increase in the German population's participation in the labour force could compensate for this.⁵⁶

Overall, employment subject to social insurance contributions increased by just under one percent or about 290,200 people in April 2023 compared to the previous year. Among foreigners,

⁵⁵ See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Monthly report on the labour and training market. June 2023, Nuremberg.

⁵⁶ See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Monthly report on the labour and training market. March 2023, Nuremberg.

employment grew by around seven percent (362,400 people). In addition to Ukrainian nationals (72,100 people, +101%), the highest increases were recorded by the group of nationals of the Western Balkan states (43,900 people, +10%) and the asylum8 states (46,400 people, +10%) (see Figure 16).⁵⁷

Employment rates describe the proportion of working-age (15 to 65 years) people in employment subject to social insurance contributions and marginal part-time employment in the total population in the respective age range and group. People employed as civil servants and self-employed people are not included in these statistics.⁵⁸ It is thus easier to compare the differ-


ent groups in terms of employment rates than in terms of their numbers.

The employment rates differ between the groups to some extent, with gaps slowly closing between some groups (see Figure 17). While the German population had an employment rate of 70 percent in April 2023, this was 53 percent among all foreign nationals. The groups of nationals from the EU eastward expansion and the Western Balkan states have the highest employment rates, at 66 and 63 percent respectively. Among the asylum8 states, the rate has been 41 percent since August 2021. There is a marked heterogeneity in this group. While the employment rate among refugees of Afghan nationality is the lowest at just under 37 percent, it is 62 percent among Eritrean nationals, which is the highest. Before the start of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, the employment rate among the Ukrainian population was still 52 percent. Due to the strong in-

57 See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Migration monitor (monthly figures). June 2023, Nuremberg.

58 See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Glossary of statistics from the Federal Employment Agency (BA), Nuremberg.

Figure 16:
Change in employment subject to social insurance contributions compared to the same month of the previous year



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

flux of Ukrainians fleeing the country, it fell to around 22 percent in April 2023.

A comparison with the previous year confirms the trend that was evident in the absolute employment figures: Only the German population shows a decline in the employment rate. All groups of foreigners show at least an unchanged employment rate. For both Western Balkan nationals and those from the EU eastward expansion, the employment rate even increased by two percentage points in each case.

A significant aspect of the integration into the labour market of people who have earned their educational qualifications outside the German education system relates to the sector in which they are employed in Germany. The Federal Employment Agency principally differentiates employees into assistant, specialist and expert jobs as well as skilled workers. No formal vocational


41%

WAS THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF PEOPLE FROM ASYLUM8 COUNTRIES IN APRIL 2023.

AVERAGE
53%

WAS THE EMPLOYMENT RATE OF THE FOREIGN POPULATION IN 2022.

Figure 17:
Employment rates of the German and foreign population aged between 15 and 65 (those subject to social security contributions and in minor employment)



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.


training is required to perform assistant activities. These people perform simple (routine) tasks. By contrast, skilled workers require vocational training or a vocational qualification. While a master craftsman or technician qualification is required for specialist activities, people are counted as experts if they have completed at least four years of higher education.⁵⁹

The employment proportions in the respective groups of nationals have remained largely constant compared to the MM21 reporting period. Only the proportion of employees in specialist occupations in the German population has increased by two percentage points, while the proportion of professionals has fallen slightly to 55

percent. Among all foreign employees as well as in all subgroups, the proportion of people employed in assistant occupations is significantly higher than in the group of German nationals (see Figure 18). While they make up 13 percent of German nationals, they account for 45 and 47 percent of nationals of the EU eastward expansion countries and the asylum8 countries, respectively. In these groups, the proportion of people in assistant jobs has decreased by one and three percentage points, respectively, compared to the reporting year 2020. At 51 percent, the group of nationals from the Western Balkan states has an above-average proportion of skilled workers compared to the other groups. At 39 percent, the proportion of employees in unskilled jobs is roughly at the same level as the group of all foreign nationals and has increased by one percentage point compared to the 2020 reporting year.

59 See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Anforderungsniveau eines Berufes, Nürnberg.

Figure 18:
Employment shares by job level and nationality in December 2022



Note: These are people in employment subject to social insurance contributions excluding apprentices (six-month values). Values below four percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

The picture is different for Ukrainians living in Germany: While the proportion of people in unskilled jobs is comparable to all foreigners at 41 percent, the proportion of highly qualified people, especially experts, is above average at 14 percent. This proportion is only one percentage point lower than in the German population.

There are considerable differences in the wages of German and foreign employees. Employees with German citizenship earn on average about 14 percent more than people with citizenship from one of the EU-15 states. This difference rises to 40 percent when compared with people from the EU-8 states, i.e. states that joined the EU in 2004 (for example Estonia or the Czech Republic). However, this descriptive difference can be attributed almost entirely to career choice as well as labour market experience and education. If only people with comparable levels of education in comparable positions are included, wages do not differ significantly from each other. A recent study also shows that the longer immigrants stay in Germany, the more their wages converge with the level of the native population.⁶⁰

Labour migration from third countries to Germany

A total of around 416,000 third-country nationals with a residence permit for gainful employment resided in Germany at the end of June 2022 (+15% compared to the previous year). Of these, around 23 percent have a permanent residence permit, i.e. unlimited residence status. Around 13 percent of the third-country nationals residing in Germany for gainful employment have been granted a residence permit under the Western Balkans regulation.⁶¹ The Western Balkans regu-

⁶⁰ See Brunow and Jost (2021). Foreign vs. German Wage Differentials in Germany: Does the Home Country Matter?, Singapur.

⁶¹ See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2023). Monitoring of educational and labour migration: Issuing residence permits to third-country nationals. Report for the first half of 2022, Nuremberg.

AT **14%**

THE PROPORTION OF EXPERTS AMONG UKRAINIAN NATIONALS IS ONLY ONE PERCENTAGE POINT LOWER THAN THE PROPORTION OF GERMAN NATIONALS EMPLOYED AS EXPERTS.

AT **51%**

THE SHARE OF SKILLED WORKERS IN ALL EMPLOYEES WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE WESTERN BALKAN STATES IS ABOVE AVERAGE COMPARED TO ALL FOREIGNERS.

23%

OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WITH A RESIDENCE TITLE FOR EMPLOYMENT HAVE A PERMANENT RESIDENCE TITLE.

lation allows people from Western Balkan states access to the German labour market even without a formal training qualification. The only requirements for the issuance of a residence permit are the existence of employment and the approval of the Federal Employment Agency. In addition, the Federal Employment Agency must carry out a priority check. In other words, it checks whether the position could be filled by an applicant from Germany. The regulation was first introduced in 2016 and extended at the beginning of 2021. It is still limited to 25,000 people per year until the end of 2023. Its extension and the quota expansion to 50,000 people were decided as part of the Federal Government's skilled labour strategy at the beginning of July 2023 (see box).⁶²

Data on the take-up of the Western Balkans scheme is currently available until the end of the second half of 2022. In the first half of 2022, a total of just under 7,300 new applications for residence were approved. Almost 54,700 people have made use of the Western Balkans scheme so far. This number is far below the possible quota, due not least to the COVID-19 pandemic. The influx to Germany under the Western Balkans scheme has been affected by particularly severe restrictions.⁶³ Despite the low qualification requirements of the labour force, the qualifications they actually brought with them roughly correspond to those of other groups of immigrants.⁶⁴

The Skilled Workers Immigration Act, which was introduced in March 2020, is also intended for workers from third countries, but the requirements for issuing a residence permit are fundamentally different. Under the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, people from third countries with recognized vocational training and an em-

ployment contract are able to enter Germany without a priority check. In addition, residence for the purpose of seeking employment is possible under the Act under certain conditions.⁶⁵ The full effect of this law, which has been in force since March 2020, was not felt for a long time due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since the introduction of the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, just under 129,600 residence permits were issued until the first half of 2022.⁶⁶ Of these, about 37,000 (or 29 percent) applications were approved in the first half of 2022. Around 44 percent of the permits granted since March 2020 were for people with academic qualifications who were allocated a residence permit under the EU Blue Card.⁶⁷ Since this form of residence was already possible under slightly different conditions before the introduction of the Skilled Workers Immigration Act, this proportion cannot be directly attributed to the Act. The Skilled Workers Immigration Act was also revised as part of the Skilled Workers Strategy (see box).

⁶⁵ See § 18 AufenthG.

⁶⁶ The BAMF reports figures on general labour migration of third-country nationals. We refer to the Migration Report of the Federal Government (2022) and its definition of skilled labour for the definition of skilled labour immigration, which includes the following groups of people: People with vocational or academic training, qualified employees as defined in Section 18 (4) of the Residence Act (old), highly qualified people, holders of an EU Blue Card, researchers, holders of the ICT card and self-employed people. We refer to the period in which the residence status was granted. An ICT card is understood to mean workers who are transferred within a company from one country to another.

⁶⁷ See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2021). Monitoring of educational and labour migration: Issuing residence permits to third-country nationals. Annual Report 2020, Nuremberg; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2022). Monitoring of educational and labour migration: Issuing residence permits to third-country nationals. Annual Report 2021, Nuremberg; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2023). Monitoring of educational and labour migration: Issuing residence permits to third-country nationals. Report for the first half of 2022, Nuremberg.

⁶² See Federal Government (2023). Germany is becoming a modern immigration country, Berlin.

⁶³ See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2022). Monitoring of educational and labour migration: Issuing residence permits to third-country nationals. Annual report 2021, Nuremberg.

⁶⁴ See Brücker et al. (2020). Evaluierung der Westbalkanregelung: Registerdaten und Betriebsfallstudien, Nuremberg.

Companies seeking workers abroad are likely to benefit from a reform of the Skilled Workers Immigration Act. The number of small and medium-sized enterprises that have expanded their recruitment abroad has risen from five percent in 2012 to 15 percent in 2022. Companies cite the high level of bureaucracy as well as difficulties in getting degrees recognized as the biggest challenges.⁶⁸

416,000

THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS RESIDED IN GERMANY WITH A RESIDENCE TITLE FOR GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT AT THE END OF JUNE 2022.

AROUND 54,700

PEOPLE WERE LIVING IN GERMANY IN MID-2022 WITH A RESIDENCE TITLE UNDER THE WESTERN BALKANS SCHEME.

AROUND 129,600

RESIDENCE PERMITS WERE GRANTED UNDER THE SKILLED WORKERS IMMIGRATION ACT UP TO AND INCLUDING JUNE 2022.

⁶⁸ See Keita and Konle-Seidl (2022). Rekrutierung von Fachkräften aus dem Ausland: Einschätzungen zu Praxis und Herausforderungen in deutschen Betrieben, Nuremberg.

The future of labour migration from third countries

After the first Skilled Workers Immigration Act came into force in March 2020, an amendment to the regulations on the immigration of skilled workers and labour migration was approved by the Cabinet in June 2023. It stipulates that immigration from third countries will be based on three pillars: 1) qualification, 2) experience and 3) potential.⁶⁹

In the first pillar, the existing Skilled Workers Immigration Act will be extended and revised with regard to the qualification requirements as well as the salary floor for the EU Blue Card. In future, people with recognized vocational qualifications will be able to work in jobs where they do not have a recognized qualification. In addition, the salary thresholds for the EU Blue Card will be lowered and the required professional experience will be reduced. The need for German language skills will be dropped. All this only applies if an employment contract is already in place at the time of entry.

The "experience" pillar addresses the professional experience of immigrants with a work contract in Germany. As long as they have two years of work experience and have completed vocational training abroad, the qualification does not have to be recognized in Germany if a given salary threshold is met.

The "potential" pillar is an opportunity card based on a points system similar to that used in Canada, for example. Points are awarded for qualifications, age, language skills and work experience, among other things. If there are enough points, the person is entitled to enter the country and can stay in Germany to look for a job.⁷⁰

In addition, the Western Balkans scheme is to be extended for a limited period of time and its quota doubled to 50,000 people. In addition, IT specialists are to be given special access to the German labour market. Last but

not least, mention should be made of the "change of track". This allows refugees who entered Germany before March 29, 2023 to withdraw their asylum application and instead seek a residence status under the Skilled Workers Immigration Act if they have the relevant qualifications and a job offer or are already employed.⁷¹

The purpose of the regulations is to alleviate the unmet demand for labour, which is as great as it last was during the economic miracle.⁷² Recruitment schemes at that time aimed to bring workers to Germany for a short period of time, while today immigrants are needed to alleviate the unmet labour demand caused by demographic change.⁷³ The amendment of the labour migration opportunities is based on the Canadian system, which places particular emphasis on highly skilled immigration. In addition, interested individuals in Canada can apply to specific provinces, which then select suitable applicants according to need⁷⁴

As part of the amendment of the Act, Barišić et al. (2023) see language skills and recognition of degrees, as well as bureaucracy, as being unresolved and creating an excessive hurdle and complicating the immigration process.⁷⁵ There is already a significant backlog of unanswered applications in many immigration offices, especially in larger cities. Up to 25 percent of positions in the immigration offices are unfilled.⁷⁶

69 See Federal Government (2023). Germany is becoming a modern immigration country, Berlin.

70 See Federal Ministry of the Interior and for Home Affairs (2023). Cabinet approves new skilled labour immigration law, Berlin.

71 See Federal Government (2023). Germany is becoming a modern immigration country, Berlin.

72 See Bauer et al. (2023). Rekord-Arbeitskräftebedarf in schwierigen Zeiten, Nuremberg.

73 See Höhne et al. (2014). Die Gastarbeiter. Geschichte und aktuelle soziale Lage, Düsseldorf; Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection (2023). New population projection of the Statistical Offices, Berlin.

74 See Council on Foreign Relations (2023). What Is Canada's Immigration Policy?, New York City.

75 See Barišić et al. (2023). Einwanderung klug, einfach und fair gestalten: Ein Vorschlag mit doppelter Dividende.

76 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2023). 25.000 offene Anfragen – allein in München, Frankfurt.

Developments on the training market

The training market has been facing major challenges for several years. Both the number of companies entitled to provide training and the number of applicants have declined in recent years. In 2022, 52 percent of all companies were entitled to provide training.⁷⁷ Since 2013, the gap between the demand for training and the number of applicants has widened at the expense of the training companies, leaving many vacancies unfilled. In addition, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find suitable applicants for a vocational training position.⁷⁸

The declining numbers of applicants in the context of refugee migration should be understood against this background. Their absolute number has decreased by 29 percent since the 2018/2019 training year. In the 2022/2023 training year, the number of applicants totalled 20,500 people as of April 2023. Of these, around 61 percent were still unsupplied in April. This is a slight year-on-year increase, but a positive trend compared to all training years since 2018/2019, where the rates of unsupplied applicants had been higher in April. The proportions shown in Figure 19 should be read in the context of the current training year. The Federal Employment Agency evaluates the training year at the end of October of the current year. Looking at the rates at this point, it becomes apparent that since the 2020/2021 training year, over 90 percent of all applicants found a training placement in the context of refugee migration. Thus, the rate of applicants who had not been provided with a training placement in the context of refugee migration was eight percent for the last completed training year 2021/2022. In the population as a whole, this rate was just under six percent in the same reporting year.⁷⁹

77 See Leber et al. (2023). Besetzungsprobleme nehmen zu, Anteil der Betriebe mit Ausbildungsberechtigung sinkt, Nuremberg.

78 See Fitzenberger et al. (2023). Passungsprobleme am Ausbildungsmarkt nehmen in der Corona-Krise weiter zu, Nuremberg.


79 See Federal Employment Agency (2022). Monthly report on the labour and training year. October 2022, Nuremberg.

Discrimination in the German labour market

In this section, we focus on research that examines whether people with a migration background, or people who are perceived as having a migration background, experience discrimination in the German labour market.

Studies from Germany show that people who can be presumed to have a migration background because of their name are discriminated against in the German labour market. Applicants who are perceived as German are more likely to receive a response to an application than those

Figure 19:
Refugee applicants for vocational training positions



Note: In each case, the applications that were successful and those that were not successful as of the reporting month of April are distinguished by colour. Successful applicants have already been offered a training position. A reporting year refers to the period from October 1 to September 30.

Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

whose name suggests a migration background. Kaas and Manger (2012) found that the likelihood of receiving an invitation to a job interview increases by 14 percent if an application is sent by a man with a German name compared to a man with a Turkish name. In smaller companies, this difference is 24 percent.^{80 81}

Weichselbaumer (2020) examined the differences in job application success between women with and without a perceived migration background and women who profess Islam and wear headscarves. The likelihood of being invited for a job interview decreases by five percentage points if the applicant has a Turkish name compared to an applicant with a German name. If the applicant is a Muslim and wears a headscarf, this difference increases to 15 percentage points. In other words, women who have a non-German surname and wear a headscarf have to send out more than four times as many applications as women who do not appear to have a migrant background and do not wear a headscarf just to get the same number of invitations to an interview. These differences persist even though the women applicants are identical in every other respect.⁸²

Fernández-Reino, Di Stasio and Veit (2022) come to similar conclusions. They differentiate according to the type of employment and find that women with headscarves are only discriminated against when they apply for jobs where there is a lot of contact with customers. The international comparison shows that a similar level of discrim-

ination exists in the Netherlands, while women with headscarves face significantly less discrimination in Spain.⁸³

Start-up activities by people with a migration background

The current macroeconomic challenges are having a dampening effect on start-up activities in Germany, as recent analyses by the Startup Verband Deutschland show.⁸⁴ Analyses are available for up-to-date figures on start-up activities by immigrants and their descendants in the Migrant Founders Monitor. Since 2019, this has been reporting results from evaluations of the microcensus as well as results of its own surveys among start-ups. Participants in this survey are recruited using snowball sampling. This means that the request to participate in the survey is sent out via multipliers, for example business angels or technology centres, and participation is voluntary. Thus, the data obtained is based on a non-randomly selected sample that cannot be considered representative of the entire start-up landscape.

In 2022, about one-fifth of all enterprises were founded by people with a migration background. However, this group is highly heterogeneous in terms of reasons for immigration and professional experience at the time they founded their business in Germany. Of all the founders with a migration background, just under 58 percent were born abroad and 42 percent in Germany. Furthermore, of the 380 founders with a migration background who participated in the study, almost 29 percent first came to Germany to study, 22 percent for professional reasons and eight percent already specifically for the start-up. Foreign-born founders see themselves at a disadvantage in some respects. This seems to be particularly evi-

80 This study also substantiates that the observed discrimination can be attributed to a phenomenon known as statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination means that employers discriminate based on their expectation of applicants' performance. Their performance is deduced based on their perceived migration background. This is distinguished from discrimination based on employers' preferences. Here, a general reluctance of a person to work with people with a migration background is the cause of the observed discrimination.

81 See Kaas and Manger (2012). *Ethnic Discrimination in Germany's Labour Market: A Field Experiment*.

82 See Weichselbaumer (2020). *Multiple Discrimination Against Female Immigrants Wearing Headscarves*.

83 See Fernández-Reino, Di Stasio und Veit (2022). *Discrimination Unveiled: A Field Experiment on the Barriers Faced by Muslim Women in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain*.

84 See Startup Verband (2023). *Deutscher Startup Monitor 2022*, Berlin.

dent when it comes to contact with authorities and offices as well as with banks.⁸⁵

Unemployment

Individuals are classified as unemployed if they are temporarily not in employment, but are looking for employment and have registered as unemployed with the Federal Employment Agency. Accordingly, people are listed in the unemployment statistics if they are not self-employed and not civil servants, but are registered as unemployed. Participants in an active labour market policy measure are not considered unemployed.⁸⁶

In April 2023, the unemployment rate among German nationals was just under five percent and it was just under 15 percent among all foreign nationals (see Figure 20). This latter figure is

85 See Startup Verband (2022). Migrant Founders Monitor, Berlin.

86 See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Unemployment, Nuremberg.

14%

IS THE INCREASED PROBABILITY OF BEING INVITED TO A JOB INTERVIEW IF A MAN HAS A GERMAN SURNAME INSTEAD OF A TURKISH SURNAME.


5th

EVERY BUSINESS START-UPS IN GERMANY IS BY A PERSON WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND.

15%

WAS THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF THE FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE IN APRIL 2023.

Figure 20:
Unemployment rates of the German and foreign labour force



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

partly influenced by the unemployment trends among Ukrainians seeking protection. Ukrainian refugees had to register as unemployed as of 1 June 2022 to receive basic social security benefits. As a result, unemployment among Ukrainian nationals jumped from just under 14 percent to 54 percent in June 2022. As Ukrainian nationals have been granted direct access to the labour market, their labour market integration is generally only comparable to that of other refugees to a limited extent (see box chapter one). The latter are not allowed to work until a waiting period of three months has passed or until they no longer reside in a reception centre.

The unemployment rate among nationals of the EU eastward expansion states was just under eight percent in April 2023, and among nationals of the Western Balkan states it was just under ten percent. Among nationals of the main countries of origin for asylum, it was around 30 percent. The tense labour market situation is reflected in the development of unemployment rates in comparison to the previous year. The unemployment rate fell slightly in comparison to the previous year only for citizens of the Western Balkan states. It rose by almost 43 percentage points for Ukrainian nationals. There was a slight increase in the unemployment rate for German nationals and other sub-groups of foreigners. Nevertheless, this amounts to no more than one percentage point in any group. Although this increase is very moderate, it nevertheless shows that the continuous decline in the unemployment rate in previous years has currently paused, especially among nationals of the asylum8 states. The unemployment trend among nationals of asylum8 states correlates with the increasing number of refugees from these countries. This can be seen if we focus on the unemployment rate among the different groups of nationals of asylum8 countries.

Refugees can be directly identified in the unemployment statistics. The unemployment rate for refugees from asylum8 states is declining (see Figure 21). In April 2023, there was a decrease of just under seven percent among nationals of the

asylum8 states compared to April 2021. The decreasing trend is evident across all individual nationalities with the exception of Afghan and Nigerian nationals. In each of these groups, the number of unemployed Afghan refugees increased by almost 20 percent and the number of unemployed Nigerian refugees increased by five percent compared to April 2021. This is accompanied by a significant increase in Afghan asylum claimants (+61% year-on-year in April 2023).⁸⁷ The absolute number of unemployed Eritrean refugees, in particular, decreased (-31% year-on-year). The number of unemployed Iranian and Iraqi refugees decreased by 18 and 16 percent respectively. There was also a downward trend among Pakistanis (-17%) and Syrian nationals (-7%). The largest group of unemployed refugees is Syrian nationals, (around 112,500 people), as they make up a large proportion of the population in Germany. There are 35,500 and 22,100 registered unemployed refugees of Afghan and Iraqi nationality in Germany respectively.

According to the current survey results, twelve percent of all companies in Germany had experience with employing refugees in 2021. At ten percent, significantly fewer small companies have experience of employing refugees than medium-sized and large companies, where 34 percent each have. In May 2022, nine percent of all companies had already had contact with Ukrainian refugees.⁸⁸ Two percent of companies had already employed refugees from Ukraine by June 2022.⁸⁹ Gürtzgen et al. (2017) find that companies that already employ people with foreign nationalities are more likely to hire refugees than companies that do not have this experience.⁹⁰

87 See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2023). Current figures. April 2023, Nuremberg.

88 See Kubis (2023). Betriebe mit entsprechenden Erfahrungen stellen häufiger Geflüchtete ein, Nuremberg.

89 See Gleiser et al. (2022). Knapp zwei Prozent der deutschen Betriebe haben bislang Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine eingestellt, Nuremberg.

90 See Gürtzgen et al. (2017). Geflüchtete kommen mehr und mehr am Arbeitsmarkt an, Nuremberg.

Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment

The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant dampening effect on the overall economic development in the years 2020 and 2021. Although the effects on the labour market were well contained by active stabilization measures such as short-time allowance, the pandemic's impact on the labour market was still clearly evident. The Federal Employment Agency concluded in March 2022 that the effects of the pandemic were only slightly perceptible at the beginning of 2022. At the same time, people lacking German language skills were even more affected by unemployment at that time than before the pandemic.⁹¹


The Federal Employment Agency quantifies the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic by assuming unemployment in 2019, extrapolating it for the years 2020 and 2021 and comparing it with the actual unemployment rate that was observed. Based on this methodology, it traces the overall difference in unemployment between 2019 and 2020 and 2021 back to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the latest since the start of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and the accompanying movement of refugees as well as the subsequent economic downturn, this effect can no longer be interpreted as merely being due to the pandemic. For this reason, we report below the COVID-19 effect up to December 2021 and focus on the group of nationals of the asylum states as well as states of the eastward EU expansion (see Figure 22).⁹²

The labour market was most strongly affected by the pandemic in March 2021. In that month, pandemic-related unemployment among nationals of the asylum countries accounted for approx. 25 percent of the total unemployment in this

91 See Federal Employment Agency (2022). Effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the labour and training market – two years of pandemic, Nuremberg.

92 See Federal Employment Agency (2020). Monthly report on the labour and training market. June 2020, Nuremberg.

Figure 21:
Unemployed people in the context of refugee migration from asylum states



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

7%

WAS THE REDUCTION IN UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF REFUGEE MIGRATION FROM ASYLUM STATES IN APRIL 2023 COMPARED TO 2021.

12%

OF ALL COMPANIES IN GERMANY HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE WITH REFUGEES IN 2021.

9%

OF COMPANIES ALREADY HAD CONTACT WITH UKRAINIAN REFUGEES IN MAY 2022.

group. However, over time unemployment recovered more rapidly in this group, reaching 2019 levels as of November 2021. Unemployment among nationals of the EU eastward expansion countries had not yet recovered by December 2021. More than 7,400 people in this group were still unemployed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic than would have been the case without the pandemic, according to the calculations. The effect was also strongest in this group in March 2021. In that month, 28 percent of all cases of unemployment among nationals of the Western Balkan countries could be traced back to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Essential occupations played a recurring role in the containment measures. Employees in these occupational fields were exempt from many of the occupational restrictions imposed by the pandemic. At the same time, immigrants make up an above-average proportion of the workforce in these occupational groups. A recent study on working conditions in essential occupations shows that there is a significantly higher propor-


tion of immigrants in essential occupations with poor working conditions than in essential occupations with better conditions. Examples of poor working conditions are highly insecure, low-paid jobs. Immigrants account for 64 percent of all employees in extremely low-paid occupations with a high degree of insecurity.⁹³

According to Auer (2023), people with a migrant background were almost four percentage points more likely to be laid off than people without a migrant background. Assuming that there were no differences in people's work performance before the pandemic and that people with a migration background were not employed at above-average rates in companies and sectors where there were more layoffs, this difference can only be attributed to discriminatory dismissal behaviour on the part of employers.⁹⁴

93 See Nivorozhkin and Poeschel (2022). Essential occupations: what are the working conditions like?

94 See Auer (2023). Firing discrimination: Selective labor market responses of firms during the COVID-19 economic crisis.

Figure 22:
COVID-19 effect on employment by selected nationalities



Source: Federal Employment Agency (2022).

Labour market integration of refugees from Ukraine

In view of the sharp increase in the number of Ukrainians on the German labour market in the wake of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, we are examining the developments of this group on the labour market separately. This section provides detailed labour market statistics on Ukrainian refugees since their arrival in Germany. We also describe the results of a survey of Ukrainian refugees conducted by the BAMF together with cooperation partners to track the living situation of Ukrainian refugees (IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey, see box). While data on general unemployment and employment statistics refer to all Ukrainian nationals currently residing in Germany, the IAB-BiB/FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey only covers people who have fled Ukraine due to the Russian war of aggression.

The labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees must be seen in light of the activation of the Mass Influx Directive (see box on page 28). One of the consequences of this was that Ukrainian nationals were granted a work permit directly after registering with the Immigration Office. Ukrainian refugees thus have better opportunities to integrate into the labour market than other refugees, who are often banned from working for several months.

As a result of the flow of refugees from Ukraine to Germany, the rate of employment subject to social insurance contributions and of exclusively marginal employment in Germany has fallen rapidly. The employment rate of the Ukrainian population, which was 46 percent before the war began in January 2022, fell to just under 14 percent by May 2022. Since then, it has been slowly recovering and stood at 18 percent in April 2023. Around 143,000 Ukrainian nationals were in employment subject to social insurance contributions in April 2023. The rate of those employed exclusively in marginal jobs fell as a result of the war, from just under six percent in

AROUND **25%**
OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG NATIONALS OF ASYLUM STATES COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN MARCH 2021.

January 2022 to two percent in April 2022. In April 2023, it was around four percent.

The implementation of the mass influx directive is also reflected in the unemployment rate of Ukrainians. As described in chapter one, since June 2022 the job centres have been responsible for taking care of Ukrainian refugees. Consequently, Ukrainian refugees had to register as unemployed as of 1 June 2022 in order to receive basic welfare benefits. Consequently, the unemployment rate among Ukrainian refugees rose to as high as around 61 percent in August 2022. Since then, it has been falling steadily and was around 53 percent in April 2023 (see Figure 23). In April 2023, 147,000 registered employable Ukrainian nationals were attending an integration course. Around 100,000 of them will complete this during the summer of 2023.⁹⁵

In absolute figures, both the employment of Ukrainian nationals subject to social insurance contributions and the marginal employment of Ukrainian nationals have risen sharply since the beginning of the war. While a total of just under 64,800 people with Ukrainian citizenship were employed in Germany before the war began in


⁹⁵ See Federal Employment Agency (2023). Auswirkungen der Fluchtmigration aus der Ukraine auf den Arbeitsmarkt und die Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende, Nuremberg.

January 2022, this number rose by around 113,700 people to just under 178,500 people in April 2023. Of these, around 143,400 people were in employment subject to social security contributions (+86,400 since January 2022). In the same period, the number of marginally employed more than quadrupled to 35,100 people in April 2023 (see Figure 24).

To shed more light on the labour market status of Ukrainian refugees, we are also reporting on those with Ukrainian citizenship who are eligible for regular benefits. People eligible for regular benefits are those who are entitled to citizen's allowance, i.e. social benefits from SGB II. Figure 25 shows the relative distribution of different groups among all those eligible for standard benefits since the beginning of 2022. Overall, the number of employable benefit claimants in-

creased from around 15,200 Ukrainian nationals in January 2022 to around 470,700 people in February 2023. Before the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine began in January 2022, the proportion of unemployed people eligible for standard benefits was just under 40 percent. After a temporary increase to just under 50 percent in August 2022, this proportion fell again and in February 2023 stood below the pre-war level at just under 37 percent. This is because 37 percent of Ukrainians eligible for regular benefits and seeking protection are in a labour market policy measure. This corresponds to almost 174,500 people. These measures include integration courses. In February 2023, just under 53,700 people (around 11%) were also in school or training. This proportion is also continuing to increase. In August 2022, for example, it had been around nine percent.

Figure 23:
Rate of employment subject to social insurance contributions and marginal employment rate as well as unemployment rate of the Ukrainian population in Germany



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

Compared to nationals of the asylum8 states, some of whom have been in Germany for longer, the proportion of people in labour market policy measures is particularly high among Ukrainian nationals. Among nationals of the asylum8 states, the proportion of people eligible for standard benefits who are able to work is around 17 percent in labour market policy measures. Another 17 percent are in school or training.


8%

WAS THE DECREASE IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG UKRAINIAN NATIONALS BETWEEN AUGUST 2022 AND APRIL 2023.

113,700

MORE PEOPLE WITH UKRAINIAN CITIZENSHIP FOUND EMPLOYMENT BY APRIL 2023 COMPARED TO JANUARY 2022.

Figure 24:
Number of employees subject to social insurance contributions and marginally employed people of the Ukrainian population in Germany



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

JUST UNDER **174,500**


UKRAINIAN NATIONALS ENTITLED TO REGULAR BENEFITS COMPLETED AN INTEGRATION COURSE IN FEBRUARY 2023.

30%

OF THE EMPLOYED UKRAINIAN REFUGEES INTERVIEWED HAVE A JOB THAT REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE.

At the time of the survey, 78 percent of the respondents stated that they would like to be gainfully employed. Of the refugees who were already in employment, 47 percent were in full-time employment and 30 percent were in part-time employment. The rest were (in descending order of frequency) in marginal employment, training or internships. The survey data allows for a more detailed analysis of the labour market status of Ukrainian refugees, on the basis of both current employment and pre-refugee labour market status. This data provides information on how easily qualifications can be transferred from Ukraine to Germany. However, only people who have already found work in Germany can be included in this analysis. These people as a whole represent only about one-sixth of all those interviewed.

Figure 25:
Eligible recipients of standard benefits in the context of refugee migration from Ukraine



Source: Federal Employment Agency 2023.

Unsurprisingly, the proportion of self-employed Ukrainian refugees decreased significantly after their arrival in Germany. While a total of 17 percent of Ukrainians who fled to Germany were self-employed in their home country, only seven percent are still self-employed in Germany. At the same time, the proportion of Ukrainians in employment in Germany is seven percentage points higher than it was in Ukraine. In general, it is assumed that some Ukrainian refugees are pursuing their employment from Ukraine either as self-employed individuals or in dependent employment from Germany.

As described above, the proportion of Ukrainian nationals in highly skilled jobs is above average compared to the rest of the foreign population. This tendency is just as evident among the refugees who came to Germany as a result of the Russian war of aggression. At the time of the survey, 30 percent of all employed participants had a job that required a university degree. Prior to their arrival in Germany, 41 percent did so. The proportion of people employed in apprenticeships was 22 percent, the same as before moving to Germany. In Germany, 29 percent of all employed Ukrainian refugees worked in jobs that did not require training (7% before moving to Germany).

The survey results also show that the probability of a Ukrainian refugee being employed in Germany increases with the level of education. For men, there is a significant increase in the likelihood of being employed if they have a vocational qualification; the same applies to women if they have a degree. Women also have a lower probability of being employed if they live in a household with their minor children. This correlation is not seen for men.⁹⁶

The IAB-BiB / FReDA-BAMF-SOEP survey

In the aftermath of the flow of refugees from Ukraine as a result of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, various German research institutions have produced a joint survey that can be used to track the integration progress of Ukrainian refugees over the next few years. The Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB), the Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF-FZ) and the Socio-Economic Panel of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin were involved. The respondents were 11,225 Ukrainian nationals who moved to Germany between February 24, 2022 and June 8, 2022 and were registered by the residents' registration offices. This is a representative survey. The findings from the second survey wave, conducted since January 2023, were not yet available at the time of going to press.

⁹⁶ See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

Racism in our society: Much more time-consuming to unlearn than to learn

In conversation with racism expert Prof. Dr Karim Fereidooni

What exactly do you mean by racism?

On the one hand, there is "classical" biological racism, which assumes that there are different races and that the white race, for example, is superior, more intelligent, more beautiful than the black race. Biologically, this is nonsense and there are no races – the concept was invented by white people to colonise black people. The first historically documented mention of races was by Queen Isabella of Spain in the 16th century: She spoke of races in order to deny Jewish people civil rights and exclude them from the Spanish kingdom, a practice that was later broadened to include Muslim people.

"ALL IT TAKES TO LEARN RACISM IS A 'NORMAL' UPBRINGING IN OUR SOCIETY."

Different biological races – that sounds like a phenomenon from the past.

Well, according to the Racism Monitor, half of the German population still believes that there are different races. Scientifically, this is demonstrably not true; there are no biological races. What does exist, however, is the racialization of

people: We have learned to divide people into different categories.

Okay, so on the one hand there is biologicistic racism, which operates with different races. What other racism is there?

Then there is neo-racism or cultural racism, which dispenses with the construct of race. The focus here is on the superiority or inferiority of cultures, languages or religious affiliations. This form of racism is much more "palatable". It manifests itself, for example, in statements like "That's just a macho Muslim culture". This kind of racism is more difficult to recognize at first.

Self-valorization also plays a role: A person's own self-image is upgraded by devaluing other people. The example statement "They treat women worse, that's because of the culture" contains the assumption "I, on the other hand, am completely different and naturally women-friendly".

However, the inherent racism is hidden behind these statements: How can we determine that? What are the characteristics of racism?

Basically, racism is a certain form of discrimination: People are devalued because of a certain characteristic. This characteristic is the ascribed or factual origin of the person.

From a position of power, specific people are categorized as "foreign" and then systematically excluded from social sub-areas such as finding housing, work or education. Then, racism manifests itself in decision-making situations: Who do I rent the flat to? Who can I consider as a partner? Who gets the job?

How do people become racists?

Growing up "normally" in our society is all it takes to learn racism. Racism is closely linked to traditions, to certain representations or ideas about groups of people. For example, black people are traditionally portrayed as needy, as people who depend on white people for help. Another traditional thread is the narrative that Muslim people have no respect for women's rights or democracy. Without these perpetuating traditional narratives, racism is unimaginable.

And how can racism be unlearned?

The first step is for people who have no experience of racism in their lives – i.e. white German people – to question themselves: Where did racism actually teach me something, like certain views or subconscious assumptions? What songs did I sing as a child, what books did I read? What was in my school textbooks? How do people talk about refugees at Grandma Erna's birthday party? How do they talk about black women, how do they talk about Muslim



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men? In short: Where am I racist – even if I don't *want* to be racist?

Can I really be racist if I don't want to be?

When it comes to racism, it doesn't whether I explicitly mean to be racist: In fact, most people would claim that they aren't racist. But they forget a very important point: It is not about the intention, but about the effect.

**"WE HAVE TO ASK
OURSELVES IF RACISM
HAS BROUGHT
US ANYTHING."**

So if I am probably racist, even though I don't really want to be: What can I do about it?

There are some things that people who aren't affected by racism can do: Reading books critical of racism, attending awareness-raising workshops, practising counter-speech - claiming that you know nothing and have no access to information or other perspectives really isn't convincing in 2023; literature that critiques

racism is only a mouse click away. Of course, I can actively resist being racist. If you can learn racism, you can unlearn racism. And anyone who wants to make a difference in this field really has everything it takes to do this.

You said that most people see racist behaviour as something alien to them. Are there certain patterns in this?

People often use distancing in the context of right-wing extremism. This is based on the assumption that the centre of society (whatever that may be) can't be racist, because racists are the ones with the jackboots. The remark "Uncle Herbert, what you just said was racist" is almost certain to be met with an indignant retort along the lines of "What are you trying to insinuate? I'm no Nazi!". By the way, the point of the comment – and this applies to the vast majority of cases – wasn't to label a person as racist, but to call out a statement that was racist. And recognizing it as such and also labelling it is important so that we can find ways to express things differently.

"RACISM IS THE OPPOSITE OF BEING EQUALS."

Another pattern is comparing the present to the past – in the sense of "from 1933 to 1945 there was racism in Germany, but since 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany has been democratic and so there's no racism any more". Of course, racism isn't officially entrenched in Germany today, there are no more Nuremberg Race Laws and no more concentration camps. But even if the Federal Republic of Germany is anti-racist in its self-image, there's still structural racism, whether in the Bundeswehr or the

police, in the school system or the labour market, in the housing market or even in the health system.

Another pattern is the culturalization that's already been mentioned. Here, "culture" becomes a kind of linguistic hiding place for "race". Nonetheless, its underlying devaluation is the same.

Does racism decrease with increasing contact?

Liking kebabs or being driven around by a Persian taxi driver doesn't make me less racist. That's not the kind of contact on an equal footing that could take place, for example, between colleagues who are at the same level. Or between friends: A police study in Hamburg showed that anti-Muslim racism was less pronounced among trainee police officers with Muslim friends than among their colleagues without Muslim friends. So there is some truth in the hypothesis "the more contact, the less prejudice" – but only if the contact takes place at the same level. And I can only get to an equal footing if I recognize that I've been socialized in a racist way to some extent and want to work on that.

Do you have any tips to help me realise how much racism affects me?

I can only recommend that everyone attend an anti-racism workshop. Also to understand how much you benefit from racism as a white German person. Because that's how it is: Even if you don't want to, you benefit from racist structures in our society.

There's also a fascinating self-test by Harvard University that involves assigning positive or negative characteristics to people you see in front of you for only a split second. And then you can see where you have internalized racist knowledge – for example, if you tend to assign

negative characteristics to black men. And once you've recognized that, you can work on it!

And what do you recommend to organizations?

The same thing, namely anti-racism workshops. And in principle, and not just for specific occasions – in other words, not because something has happened, but so that it becomes a professional competence. Let's use the example of Malteser and their work with refugees to clarify the issue of professional competence: It isn't just a matter of assigning blame, in the sense of "You're a racist and that's why you need this anti-racism training." Rather, it's about being able to reflect on yourself and to understand that this competence is important for your fundamental professional work. So, to come back to the example: "You need this so you can handle refugees well."

By the way, the issue of being on equal footing is particularly delicate in situations where one person is helping another. The person helping and the person receiving help aren't on equal terms per se: While one person gives, knows about and can allocate resources, the other is in a receiving, dependent position. In this case, we need to look at our internalized perceptions even more. Looking at the person sitting in front of me isn't enough, because I also have to look at myself: How did I grow up and what bodies of knowledge did racism teach me?

So racism has much more to do with us than we might like to believe?

Racism doesn't just start with the Molotov cocktail thrown against a house wall. Developing scepticism towards people because of their ascribed or factual origin – that's where racism starts. With scepticism: "Can you even be a professor, a good teacher, a competent doctor the way you look?" and this, as I said, not

arbitrarily towards any people, but towards groups of people who have been constructed as foreign, as different, for hundreds of years.

"WHEREVER PEOPLE COME TOGETHER, RACISM PLAYS A ROLE."

Can we manage to banish racism from our thinking?

It's hard to imagine contexts free of racism, because wherever people come together, racism plays a role. However, there can be spaces that are sensitive to racism: where people develop strategies to recognize racism and break through racist patterns. Family, circle of friends or even the work environment – all of these can become spaces that are sensitive to racism.

The challenge is that it takes much more effort to unlearn racism than to learn it: Unlearning racism is an active process in which people have to decide every day that they don't want to act in a racist way.

Thank you very much for the interview!



Crime – Felonies and Human Trafficking



Crime – Felonies and Human Trafficking

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Amanda März

A brief overview of the most important facts

- Between 2016 and 2021, reported crime in Germany was on the decline. In 2021, seven percent of all registered suspects were refugees.
- The number of refugee suspects increased by 16 percent from January to September 2022 compared to the same period last year. This has been accompanied by an increase in immigration as well as the end of Covid-related restrictions and the return to public life.
- In 2021, five percent of all registered victims of crime were refugees. Almost 51,200 crimes were registered against them.
- The number of xenophobic crimes in the category of politically motivated hate crime increased by approximately three percent in 2022 compared to the previous year.
- In 2021, about 25 percent of trafficking and exploitation victims among immigrants had a residence permit, while about 26 percent were tolerated. In half of the cases, the residence prospect was unclear or uncertain.

The connection between migration and crime is complex. Refugees can be perpetrators, but also victims of crimes such as right-wing violence or human trafficking. Both possibilities are discussed in this chapter. The German public shows an ongoing interest in the involvement of people with a migration background in crime. For example, attacks on police, fire brigade and ambulance personnel on New Year's Eve in 2022 triggered a broad political and media debate, especially about the integration of young men with a migration background.

Using the Police Crime Statistics (PKS), we provide an overview of crime trends since 2019 and address the nationalities and socio-demographics of refugee suspects and victims of crime. In this context, we look at the role of the media, which has a particularly strong influence on the public perception of refugee suspects. This chapter also includes the development of xenophobic crimes as well as human trafficking and exploitation in the context of migration and flight. We also focus on human trafficking in the context of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine.

The development of crime since 2019

Between 2016 and 2021, reported crime in Germany declined. In 2021, the number of refugee suspects decreased by seven percent over the previous year.⁹⁷ In addition, the number of refugee suspects recorded in 2021 was seven percent

⁹⁷ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Crime in the context of immigration. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

lower than in the previous year. Based on the crime suspect statistics of the PKS, it is difficult to measure the influence of the measures to contain the pandemic in 2020 and 2021. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that they have had an impact on migration movements and criminal trends. The pandemic-related restrictions in public spaces are likely to have led to a reduction in theft in particular, as people spent more time in their own homes.⁹⁸

2022 saw an increase in overall crime again for the first time.⁹⁹ The number of non-German suspects increased by 16 percent from January to September 2022 compared to the same period last year.¹⁰⁰ The number of refugee suspects has increased by twelve percent compared to the previous year. This 2022 development is partly explained by the end of Covid-related restrictions and the return to public life. During 2022, the restrictions associated with the pandemic were removed or at least reduced. At the same time, the number of refugees in Germany increased significantly in 2022 (see Chapter 1), which is also likely to have contributed to an absolute increase in crime among refugees.

A total of around 5.6 million crimes were registered nationwide in 2022. This corresponds to an increase of almost four percent compared to 2019 (see Figure 26).¹⁰¹ The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Home Affairs cites various socio-political explanations for this development.¹⁰² In the categories of rape, sexual assault

Police crime statistics (PKS)

The crime suspect statistics of the PKS are the most significant statistics on crime in Germany. However, when interpreting the statistics on suspects, it must be borne in mind that their informative value is limited for various reasons:

- PKS are recorded crime statistics. Only detected or reported offences are recorded. Unrecorded crime includes offences and crimes that are not known to the police authorities, i.e. they are either not reported or go unnoticed.
- PKS are suspicion-based statistics. Only suspects are recorded, not convicted offenders. This means that not everyone included in the statistics has actually committed crimes.
- Serious offences are more likely to be reported than lesser offences. Hence, the PKS probably place too much significance on serious crimes.
- Crimes that take a long time to investigate are entered into the PKS after a delay.
- People suspected of multiple offences are only included once in the PKS.
- The category "non-German suspects" includes tourists in addition to foreigners living in Germany, so the number of non-German suspects cannot be compared to the number of foreigners living in Germany.
- The category "immigrants" (since 2016) includes the various reasons for residence "asylum seeker", "person entitled to protection and asylum, quota refugee", "tolerated stay" or "unauthorised stay". For the sake of consistency and better understanding, we refer to this group as refugees in this chapter as well as elsewhere in the report.

98 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Police crime statistics 2021. Ausgewählte Zahlen im Überblick, Wiesbaden.


99 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Police crime statistics 2022. Ausgewählte Zahlen im Überblick, Wiesbaden.

100 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Crime in the context of immigration. Core statements Period under review 01/01–30/09/2022, Wiesbaden.

101 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Police crime statistics 2022. Ausgewählte Zahlen im Überblick, Wiesbaden.

102 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Police crime statistics 2022. Ausgewählte Zahlen im Überblick, Wiesbaden.


Figure 26:
Development in the number of all reported crimes in one year in Germany



Note: Violations of residence or asylum procedure laws are not considered. Suspects who are refugees are represented in the PKS as a sub-category of non-German suspects. Thus, the total number of suspects is the sum of German and non-German suspects.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Police crime statistics 2022. An overview of selected figures.


Figure 27:
Comparison of German, non-German and refugee suspects by offence in 2022



and sexual coercion, for example, the figures could indicate a shift from these crimes being obscured to them being brought into the open, which is explained by an increased willingness to report, partly due to the #metoo movement. The tightening of the law to combat right-wing extremism and hate crime in April 2021 is likely to have played a role in the increase in the number of threat-related cases.

to dangerous offences and theft, as well as property damage and forgery. Refugee suspects tended to be underrepresented in drug-related offences and crimes against sexual self-determination (see Figure 27).

For German, non-German and refugee suspects in 2022, most were suspected of a violent offence, which mainly includes bodily harm. Around 51,900 refugees were suspected of having committed a violent offence or a crime against personal freedom. Refugee suspects are overrepresented compared to German suspects in relation



Note: The dark blue and grey lines indicate whether refugee or non-German suspects of a crime are overrepresented or underrepresented compared to German suspects. Calculation as in the SVR Migration Annual Report 2019.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). Police crime statistics 2022. Own calculations; own presentation.

4%

INCREASE IN CRIME OVERALL COMPARED TO 2019.

JUST ABOUT 51,200

CRIMES AGAINST REFUGEES WERE REGISTERED IN 2021.

AROUND 86 %

OF THE REFUGEE SUSPECTS WERE MALE.


APPROXIMATELY 50%

OF THE REFUGEE VICTIMS WERE SYRIAN, AFGHAN OR IRAQI NATIONALS.

72%

OF ALL REFUGEE VICTIMS WERE MALE.

Figure 28:
Comparison of the proportion of suspects with the proportion of refugees by nationality



Note: Around 2.18 million refugees who applied for asylum in 2015 to 2019. Values below four percent are not shown for ease of readability.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Crime in the context of immigration. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021. Police crime statistics 2021. PKS table 62: Offences and nationalities of non-German suspects.

Nationalities and socio-demographics of refugee suspects

To get a better picture of the development of crime among refugees, it is important to view it in the context of the development of immigration to Germany (see Figure 28). 36 percent of the refugee suspects in 2021 come from one of the five countries of asylum origin: Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Somalia or Syria. They represent 54 percent of refugees who came to Germany from 2015 to 2021. This means that refugee suspects are clearly underrepresented in this group in relation to their proportion of all refugees. The proportion of refugee suspects from Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan is 16 percent, one percentage point below their share of all refugees who came to Germany in the years 2015 to 2021. Refugee suspects from the North African Maghreb states (8% of all refugee suspects) were overrepresented in comparison to their share of all asylum seekers in the period under review (2% of all refugees).

In 2021, 86 percent of the refugee suspects were male and 58 percent of them were younger than 30. These values deviate only marginally from the previous year.¹⁰³ In addition, almost one third of the refugee suspects were suspected of multiple offences. Theft is the type of offence with the highest proportion of refugees suspected of multiple offences.

103 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Crime in the context of immigration. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden. Similarly to the definitions in the PKS, a person suspected of a crime is considered an immigrant in the Federal Situation Report if they were registered as "asylum seeker", "person entitled to protection and asylum", "quota refugee", "tolerated stay" or "unauthorised stay".

Nationalities and socio-demographics of crime victims

In contrast to the mention of suspects in the PKS, repeat victims are recorded statistically several times in the PKS.¹⁰⁴ In 2021, around five percent of all registered victims in the PKS were refugees. Almost 51,200 crimes against refugees were registered in 2021.¹⁰⁵ This is about twelve percent less than in 2020 (57,200 cases). Most of the cases in which refugees were victims of a crime involved bodily harm (75%). Compared to the previous year, the number of offences involving bodily harm decreased by 14 percentage points.

Half of the victims from the group of refugees were Syrian (about 13,500 cases), Afghan (about 6,700 cases) or Iraqi nationals (about 4,500 cases). The number of cases in 2021 decreased for all three nationalities compared to the previous year. Most victims among refugees are male (about 72%). One exception to this is the area of crimes against sexual self-determination. In these cases, 87 percent of the refugee victims were female.

The role of the media

The media influence public perceptions of migration-related crime by the way they report on it. Analyses by Hestermann (2019, 2022) show that foreign suspects are mentioned proportionally more frequently than their actual statistical share of all suspects. (see Figure 29). Suspects' national

104 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Crime in the context of immigration. Federal Situation Report 2020, Wiesbaden. Since the reporting year 2020, the residence status of non-German victims has been mapped and evaluated similarly to the non-German suspects via the catalogue of reasons for residence (= asylum seeker, person entitled to protection and asylum and quota refugee, toleration, unauthorised residence). The term and definition "immigrant" is now also used for victims. For this reason, it is not possible to compare the data that concern a victim with the status of "immigrant" with the reporting years before 2020.

105 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Crime in the context of immigration. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

origin is usually only mentioned if they are foreigners. In 2019, foreign crime suspects were mentioned 19 times more often in television reports and 32 times more often in newspaper reports than their statistical representation among all suspects.¹⁰⁶ This bias persisted in 2021. In television reports, the bias remains the same, while in newspaper reports it is slightly decreasing, but foreign suspects are still mentioned about 16 times more often than their proportion of all suspects.¹⁰⁷ Part of the decrease could be explained by the fact that the German Press Council changed Guideline 12.1 of the Press Code on reporting on criminal offences in 2017: The origin of foreign suspects should not be mentioned if there is no justified public interest.

However, Hestermann's results can only be interpreted to a limited extent, as articles are not selected randomly from all daily news items for a day. Furthermore, it does not accurately reflect police crime suspect statistics. The studies look at the main news and tabloid magazines of the eight television stations with the highest reach and national sections of the national editions of the national daily newspapers with the highest circulation over four calendar weeks in January, February, March and April of the respective reporting years.

Mentioning the origin or immigration history of foreign crime suspects not only has a distorting effect on public perceptions of crime related to persons refugees, but also has other effects

on society.¹⁰⁸ These mentions suggest that origin or immigration history is a significant cause of criminal behaviour. However, crime should be seen as a consequence of different factors. Naming of the origin of suspects can also contribute to group constructions and thus promote discrimination against people with a history of immigration.¹⁰⁹

Development of xenophobic crimes

The number of xenophobic crimes in the category of politically motivated hate crime increased by approximately three percent in 2022 compared to the previous year. With the exception of 2017 and 2021, case numbers have been steadily increasing for several years. In 2022, there were about 8,400 xenophobic crimes, of which eleven percent were violent crimes (see Figure 30). According to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), politically motivated criminals on the right continue to use the immigration situation as an excuse for agitation and crimes. Right-wing extremists, which are otherwise heterogeneous, have come to an ideological consensus on the refugee issue. The extent of politically motivated crime, i.e. the number of crimes from the right-wing spectrum, depends strongly on the organisational possibilities of the respective local scene.¹¹⁰

A recent study investigated crimes against refugees during the massive influx of refugees to Germany in 2014 and 2015.¹¹¹ The results suggest that regional asylum seeker numbers are not what is driving the rise in hate crime. Areas with

106 See Malteser Migration Report 2021, Cologne.

107 See Hestermann (2019). *Wie häufig nennen Medien die Herkunft von Tatverdächtigen*, Hamburg, Hestermann (2022). *Zwischen Stürmerstars und Gewalttätern. Die Berichterstattung über Eingewanderte und Geflüchtete*, Hamburg. Own calculation: Of 635,541 suspects in violent offences recorded by the police in 2021, 444,471 were Germans and 191,070 were non-Germans. The ratio of German to foreign suspects in violent offences according to PKS 2021 is 2.32 (69.9 to 30.1%). In newspaper reporting 2021 the numerical ratio of foreigners to Germans is 6.82 (25.9 to 3.8 %), which makes the bias factor approximately 15.83 (2.32 x 6.82). In the 2021 TV coverage, the numerical ratio of foreigners to Germans is 8.13 (12.2 to 1.5%), making the bias factor approximately 18.88 (2.32 x 8.13).

108 See Singelstein and Walburg (2021). *Sollten Medien die Herkunft von Tatverdächtigen nennen?*, Berlin.


109 See Singelstein and Walburg (2021). *Sollten Medien die Herkunft von Tatverdächtigen nennen?*, Berlin.

110 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2023). *Crime in the context of immigration. Core statements in the period under review January 1–September 30, 2022*, Wiesbaden.

111 See Entorf and Lange (2023). *Refugees welcome? Understanding the regional heterogeneity of anti-refugee hate crime*.

Figure 29:

Comparison of the mention of origin in the reporting of violence compared to the share of suspects in the PKS in the years 2014, 2017, 2019 and 2021




Note: The reporting case number refers to 230 reports in 2014, 314 reports in 2017, 199 TV reports and 256 newspaper reports in 2019 and 131 TV reports and 209 newspaper reports in 2021. Values below five percent are not shown for ease of readability.

- German suspects
- Non-German suspects
- Unknown origin

Sources: Federal Criminal Police Office (2020) and Hestermann (2019); own presentation. Federal Criminal Police Office (2021) and Hestermann (2022).

Figure 30:

Development of the number of cases of xenophobic crimes in politically right-wing motivated hate crime



Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Home Affairs (2023). Overview of "hate crime" Development of case numbers 2011–2022, own presentation.

8,400

XENOPHOBIC CRIMES
WERE REGISTERED IN 2022.

11%

OF XENOPHOBIC CRIMES
IN 2022 WERE VIOLENT CRIMES.

291

PROCEEDINGS FOR HUMAN TRAFFICKING
FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION WERE
REGISTERED IN 2021.

a previously low proportion of residents with a migration background that are confronted with a large influx of asylum seekers experienced the greatest increase in hate crime. Economically disadvantaged regions or regions where racist crimes have occurred in the past are just as susceptible to hate crime against refugees at an above-average rate.

Human trafficking and exploitation in the context of migration

The term human trafficking is defined in the German Criminal Code as recruiting, transporting or harbouring a person for the purpose of exploitation (Section 232 StGB).¹¹² This includes human trafficking, forced prostitution, forced labour, labour exploitation, exploitation with imprisonment and organ trafficking. In its annual "Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation", the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) reports current case figures for various forms of human trafficking and distinguishes between six forms of human trafficking in accordance with the Criminal Code: Trafficking for the purpose of 1) sexual exploitation, 2) labour exploitation, 3) exploitation for the purpose of begging, 4) exploitation for the purpose of committing acts punishable by law, 5) forced marriage and 6) exploitation of minors.¹¹³

In 2021, the number of cases of human trafficking and exploitation increased by ten percent overall compared to 2020 (see Figure 31).¹¹⁴ The number of proceedings for the exploitation of minors has risen particularly fast, with an increase of 23 percent. New competences of the Financial Control of Undeclared Work Unit (FKS), the customs administration for the control of labour exploitation, explain the increase of 27 percent in these offences.

In 2021, the number of proceedings for "human trafficking for sexual exploitation" remained constant compared to the previous year at 291 proceedings. Meanwhile, the number of victims increased to 417 people (+3% compared to the previous year), and the number of suspects was 391 (-7%).

112 See KOK (2022). Datenerhebung zu Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung in Deutschland, Berlin.

113 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

114 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation continued to shift from street, bar and brothel prostitution to private residences in 2021. This development, which has been going on for a long time, was exacerbated by the closures of official prostitution sites for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the number of victims engaging in prostitution in private homes increased by 59 percent compared to the previous year. In contrast, the number of prostitution victims in bars and brothels has decreased by 29 percent and the number of victims in street prostitution by 59 percent (see Figure 32). Most victims of sexual exploitation are female (94%). As in the previous year, the victims were mainly of German (23%), Bulgarian (17%) and Romanian nationality (16%) (see Figure 33). The nationalities of the perpetrators are similarly distributed: German (25%), Bulgarian (19%) and Romanian (15%) nationals accounted for the largest share of suspects (see Figure 34).

In 2021, a new five-year high was reached in labour exploitation proceedings (see Figure 35). The number of labour exploitation cases taken up in 2021 was 28 (+27% compared to the previous year). At the same time, 147 victims (+101%) and 52 suspects (+21%) were registered. Among them, 38 were men and 14 were women. The reason for the significant increase is a major case by the Financial Investigation Office for Clandestine Employment concluded in the reporting year involving 70 victims in the care sector. In this case, people were supposedly recruited for an internship in cooperation with Bosnian and Croatian universities by a German nursing service. After a very short training period, they were employed as full-fledged workers, but paid only an hourly wage of about three to four euros.

There were fewer cases in the areas of begging, punishable acts and forced marriage compared to other forms of trafficking. In the area of exploitation for the purpose of begging, six proceedings with six victims and ten suspects were registered in 2021. As long as there is no exploitation, organised begging is not itself a punishable

Data on human trafficking

In 2019, the report of the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Human Trafficking (the "GRETA Report") stated that there is a fundamental need to improve the data situation in regard to human trafficking in Germany.¹¹⁵ Until then, the only reliable source of data on human trafficking was the Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking of the Federal Criminal Police Office, which only records investigations concluded by the police. With respect to refugee victims of human trafficking, the GRETA report stressed that Germany's data and mechanisms for identifying victims among refugees, especially in initial reception centres, were insufficient and urgently needed to be improved.¹¹⁶ In response, the Federal Anti-Trafficking Coordinating Group (KOK) launched a new data tool in October 2020. The aim of the data tool is to establish a transparent and comprehensible monitoring procedure for human trafficking. It supplements the statistical surveys of the Federal Criminal Police Office and represents a civil society and human rights-based perspective on the issue. The following statements refer to data from the Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and to the data tool of KOK e. V. Nevertheless, human trafficking remains a crime with a high number of unreported cases and a limited amount of meaningful data.


115 See GRETA (2019). Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Human trafficking by Germany, Straßburg.

116 See KOK (2020). Defining the Gap: Datenerhebung zu Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung in Deutschland – der zivilgesellschaftliche Ansatz des KOK, Berlin.

94%

OF THE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION ARE FEMALE.


Figure 31:
Development of procedures for human trafficking and exploitation



Note: The exploitation of minors is recorded for the first time in 2016. Proceedings for exploitation for the purpose of committing criminal offences as well as for the purpose of begging have been considered separately since 2017.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.


Figure 32:
Circumstances of sexual exploitation between 2019 and 2021



Note: This is an extract. Multiple answers are possible.


Sources: Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report 2020; Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.

Figure 33:
Sexual exploitation – most frequent victim nationalities in 2021




Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.

Figure 34:
Sexual exploitation – most frequent nationalities of suspects in 2021




Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.

Figure 35:
Most frequent types of employment of victims of labour exploitation – 2020 to 2021



Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.

Figure 36:
Offences concerning the commercial sexual exploitation of minors – between 2020 and 2021



Note: Multiple answers possible. Offences from the Criminal Code. The category "other" includes serious sexual abuse of children, sexual abuse of children, sexual abuse of children without physical contact with the child and offering a child for sexual abuse.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation 2021.

offence in Germany. Exploitation for the purpose of criminal acts is the exploitation of a person to make them commit criminal offences such as pickpocketing or shoplifting, drug dealing and similar acts. This is done with the motive of financial profit.¹¹⁷ In 2021, there were ten proceedings in this area with eleven victims and 17 suspects. In addition, ten proceedings were conducted in 2021 based on suspicion of forced marriage. All the victims were female and between 14 and 23 years old. Seven of the ten victims came from South-Eastern Europe or Afghanistan.

In 2021, proceedings for the exploitation of minors have risen sharply compared to the previous year with 23 percent. Commercial sexual ex-

117 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

ploitation of minors accounted for the largest share (see Figure 36). This refers to "sexual abuse by adults and payment of the child or a third person in money or kind. The child is treated as a sexual object as well as a commodity".¹¹⁸ In 2021, 76 percent of underage victims were between 14 and 17 years old. 28 percent of the underage victims were non-German nationals. There were also proceedings involving underage victims due to labour exploitation (five proceedings), exploitation in the commission of punishable acts (six proceedings), forced marriage (five proceedings), child trafficking (one proceeding) and exploitation for the purpose of begging (one proceeding).


Human trafficking in the context of flight

As mentioned, the interpretability of the BKA data for human trafficking is limited. Neither the category of asylum procedure nor the protection status are recorded in the statistics of the BKA. In addition, only the cases known to the police in which the investigation proceedings have been concluded are mentioned in the report. The KOK developed a data tool to better illustrate the extent of human trafficking. However, this only covers a sample of the clients of the 19 cooperating counselling centres and is therefore limited in its interpretability.

This is because the victims have to give their consent. Not all victims give their consent to the specialised counselling centres to collect data. In addition, not all questions of the data tool are answered in the same way because the staff of the specialised counselling centres can decide on a case-by-case basis whether to ask certain questions or not. Also, multiple answers are possible. It is therefore possible for several cases to be created for one person and thus for a case to be re-

118 See Federal Criminal Police Office (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung. Federal Situation Report 2021, Wiesbaden.

Figure 37:
Residence status of trafficked persons in 2021



Note: The figure refers to 612 cases with the corresponding information in the data tool.

Source: KOK (2022). Data collection on human trafficking and exploitation in Germany.

corded several times. Nevertheless, the data tool provides an insight into human trafficking that goes beyond the federal situation report of the Federal Criminal Police Office. In 2021, data for the whole year was collected for the first time, which allows for a comprehensive comparison with the BKA data.

In contrast to the BKA data, the KOK data tool records the residence status of trafficked persons. In 2021, about 25 percent of those concerned had a residence permit. About 26 percent of those affected were tolerated. In half of the cases, the residence prospect is unclear or uncertain (see Figure 37).¹¹⁹ Secure residence status is usually a prerequisite for secure accommodation or compensation claims by victims.

Human trafficking in the context of the Ukraine war

According to the KOK, people who are fleeing or in war and crisis zones are at particularly high risk of becoming victims of human trafficking.¹²⁰ Precarious accommodation, limited rights, gaps in the support system and lack of information about their own legal situation are factors that increase vulnerability. A clear picture of current trafficking case numbers in the context of the Ukraine war is not yet possible because the process of identifying and solving trafficking cases is slow and difficult.

The perpetrators of human trafficking have less opportunity to exert influence if those seeking protection are guaranteed the right to stay in the destination country. As there is a secure residence status for those seeking protection from Ukraine through the Mass Influx Directive (see box in Chapter 1), it is expected that this group will be less exposed to the dangers of trafficking.

Ukrainian refugees were offered accommodation in private flats or houses by many people from the German civilian population. The first accommodation placements took place without pre-registration or security.¹²¹ This commitment showed the solidarity and willingness of the German civilian population after the summer of 2015. However, this was problematic for identifying trafficked persons and exploited persons, as it made registration more difficult.¹²² Specialist counselling centres report individual cases in which women were offered accommodation in return for sexual services. There may also have been overlap with labour exploitation in the private sector if clear limits were not set on appropriate household activities.¹²³

119 See KOK (2022). Datenerhebung zu Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung in Deutschland, Berlin.

120 See KOK (2023). Betroffene von Menschenhandel im Kontext von Flucht, Berlin.

121 See KOK (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung im Kontext des Ukrainekrieges – Eine Untersuchung aus Sicht spezialisierter Fachberatungsstellen zur Situation in Deutschland, Berlin.

122 See KOK (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung im Kontext des Ukrainekrieges – Eine Untersuchung aus Sicht spezialisierter Fachberatungsstellen zur Situation in Deutschland, Berlin.

123 See KOK (2022). Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung im Kontext des Ukrainekrieges – Eine Untersuchung aus Sicht spezialisierter Fachberatungsstellen zur Situation in Deutschland, Berlin.

Social Participation – Integration of Refugees





Social Participation – Integration of Refugees

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Amanda März

A brief overview of the most important facts

- Despite the major challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, the integration climate has improved compared with previous years. However, people with a migrant background still feel a strong sense of disadvantage.
- Refugees' language skills are improving steadily. Compared to previous years, however, the increase was smaller in 2020, a year severely marked by the pandemic. In 2022, 83 percent of refugees from Ukraine rated their German language skills as "low."
- Between 2016 and 2018, the educational participation of refugees increased, but since 2018, a slightly negative trend has been observed. In 2020, the education participation of refugee women is significantly lower than that of male refugees.
- There are clear differences in contact with the host society between male refugees and female refugees. In 2020, 43 percent of men had daily contact with Germans at work, compared with only 16 percent of women.
- Most Ukrainian refugees feel welcome in Germany.

Integration is a complex process which is difficult to measure. Its development and success are shaped by both the attitudes of refugees and those of the host society. In this context, acquiring language skills and education as well as awareness of traditions and informal rules play a major role. This chapter discusses the current level and climate of integration in Germany based on current data against the backdrop of the recent crises.

Despite the challenges of integrating refugees in recent years, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and currently the Ukraine war, the integration climate in Germany improved compared to previous years. This can be seen in data from the Integration Climate Index of the German Council of Experts on Integration and Migration (SVR-Migration), collected from November 2021 to July 2022.¹²⁴ In particular, people with no migration background are perceiving an improvement in the integration climate compared to previous years. Individuals with a migration background also perceive a positive trend, although only moderately. This slightly positive development in no way alters the fact that people with a migration background still feel strongly that they are disadvantaged. Likewise, the political participation of people with a migration background lags behind that of people without a migration background.

In line with the approach taken in MM19 and MM21, the integration of refugees is considered in three areas: identificational, cognitive-cultural

124 See SVR-Migration (2022). Integrationsklima 2022: Leicht verbessert mit einzelnen Eintrübungen, Berlin.

and social integration. This division borrows from Esser's (2001) categorization.¹²⁵ Identificational integration refers to the identification of refugees with the values and culture of the host society as well as the attitudes of the host society toward the refugees. Cognitive-cultural integration takes place on the basis of participation through education and the acquisition of language skills. This includes the refugees' awareness of traditions and informal rules of the host society. Social integration refers to the social relationships between refugees and people in the host society and takes place through contact between these two groups and through the refugees' housing situation.

This chapter focuses on the effects of integration following the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic. 2022 was marked by the largest exodus of refugees since the Second World War. Since the start of 2022, more than one million refugees have arrived in Germany from Ukraine.¹²⁶ Yet, even before the current crisis, which is being felt by the German population with sharp increases in energy prices and generally high inflation, society faced extraordinary circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic. Measures that were introduced led to strict contact restrictions, and closures of businesses and educational and care institutions.¹²⁷ Events unfolded in a fast-paced manner, as policymakers continued to adjust measures in response to infectious events.

We discuss current developments in each integration area on the basis of the fifth wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees (see box). This representative survey of the refugee population in Germany can be used to examine subjective

aspects of integration such as frequency of contact and identification, which are not available in official statistics. Another advantage is that the data are collected annually and can thus shed light on integration trends and the integration climate. Since the fifth wave was collected during the first Covid-19 pandemic year, it is possible to examine how the Covid-19 pandemic has affected integration processes in Germany.¹²⁸ It should be noted that parts of the survey were conducted during relative relaxations of COVID-19 protections and others during severe restrictions.

128 See Niehues (2022). Fünfte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Entwicklung der Deutschkenntnisse, Sorgen und Lebenszufriedenheit bei Geflüchteten während des ersten Covid-19-Pandemiejahres, Nürnberg.

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees is an annual repeat survey of individuals who arrived in Germany and applied for asylum between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2016, inclusive. In the fifth survey wave between August 2020 and February 2021, people who arrived in Germany between January 2017 and June 2019 were additionally surveyed for the first time.¹²⁹ The sample is drawn randomly from the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR) regardless of the course and outcome of the asylum procedure. The sample included 4,351 respondents in 2016, 5,502 in 2017, 4,307 in 2018, 3,866 in 2019, and 4,423 in 2020. Weighting methods can be used to make representative statements about the experiences and attitudes of immigrant groups of refugees in Germany. The following analyses refer to adult refugees.


129 See Steinhauer et al. (2022). Sampling, Nonresponse, and Weighting of the 2020 Refreshment Sample (M6) of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Panel, Berlin.

125 See Esser (2001). Integration und ethnische Schichtung. Structural integration is discussed in previous chapters.

126 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.


127 See Niehues (2022). Fünfte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Entwicklung der Deutschkenntnisse, Sorgen und Lebenszufriedenheit bei Geflüchteten während des ersten Covid-19-Pandemiejahres, Nürnberg.

Figure 38:
Refugees' feeling of being welcome in Germany 2020



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N=1,261, "Do you feel welcome in Germany today?"

Figure 39:
Discrimination experiences of refugees in 2019 compared to 2020



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N= 280 for 2019 and N=1,261 for 2020, "How often have you personally experienced being disadvantaged here in Germany because of your origin?"


78%

OF RESPONDENTS FEEL FULLY OR MOSTLY WELCOME IN GERMANY.

9%

OF RESPONDENTS OFTEN WORRY ABOUT XENOPHOBIA.

Figure 40:
Concerns about xenophobia in 2019 compared to 2020



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N=3,860 for 2019 and N=4,423 for 2020, "Are you concerned about xenophobia in Germany?"

Identificatory integration

Successful political and social participation as well as the affiliation and identification of refugees with the host society is a two-way process in which the attitudes of both the refugees and the host society play a major role. For the most part, refugees feel welcome in Germany (see Figure 38): In 2020, 78 percent of respondents felt "mostly" or "fully" welcome in Germany; only six percent of respondents felt "hardly" or "not at all" welcome. Since 2016, refugees' sense of being welcome has remained relatively constant. A clear majority of refugees would like to remain in Germany in the long term.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, refugees' experiences of disadvantage increased between 2019 and 2020. In 2019, only two percent of respondents frequently had the personal experience of being disadvantaged because of their origin (see Figure 39). In 2020, this figure increased to eight percent. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who have never had such experiences dropped from 78 percent to 63 percent. Moreover, respondents were more concerned about xenophobia in 2020 than in the previous year: About 27 percent of respondents were "somewhat concerned" about xenophobia in 2020, which was an increase of five percentage points from the previous year (see Figure 40). The percentage of respondents who were "very concerned" about xenophobia did not change significantly.

The above figures show an increase in perceived discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic.¹³¹ It should be noted that perceived discrimination is different from actual discrimination, although the two are highly correlated. Perception of discrimination is subjective. Nonethe-

less, it is used as a measure of discrimination because actual discrimination is difficult to measure.

Discrimination can affect the integration of refugees. Not only does it affect interpersonal interaction between refugees and the host society, but it also restricts access to various sectors of society, such as the labour market and educational institutions. The proportion of refugees who felt discriminated against in educational institutions almost doubled from 2019 to 2020 (from 17% to 32%). The reason for the increase in perceived discrimination is most likely the severe restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of these restrictions, many educational services, including integration courses, were offered exclusively online. Many refugees did not have the technical equipment to participate in these courses. A lack of language skills also made this process more difficult. Perceived disadvantage in the labour market also rose significantly. This could be due to refugees working in sectors such as catering and tourism that were more affected by the pandemic.¹³²

To measure Europeans' attitudes toward immigration and integration of people from non-EU countries, a Eurobarometer survey on integration was conducted in 27 European countries, including Germany, in 2021.¹³³ As shown in Figure 41, about 83 percent of respondents in Germany say they would feel "comfortable" being friends with immigrants. Around 73 percent feel "comfortable" with the idea of having an immigrant as a "family member."

A core component of identificational integration is political participation, i.e. the extent to which people influence political decisions through political participation and promote their own inter-

130 See De Paiva Lareiro et al. (2020). Dritte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten. Geflüchtete verbessern ihre Deutschkenntnisse und fühlen sich in Deutschland weiterhin willkommen, Nürnberg.

131 See Cardozo Silva et al. (2022). Geflüchtete in Deutschland fühlten sich in der Corona-Pandemie stärker diskriminiert als zuvor, Berlin.

132 See Cardozo Silva et al. (2022). Geflüchtete in Deutschland fühlten sich in der Corona-Pandemie stärker diskriminiert als zuvor, Berlin.

133 See European Commission (2022). Special Eurobarometer: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, Brüssel.

ests. The SVR Integration Barometer 2022 shows a clear difference in voter turnout between people with and without a migration background. Among people without a migration background, voter turnout is just under 88 percent, while voter turnout among people with a migration background is 70 percent. Political participation is a core component of successful integration, so this difference indicates an obstacle to integration.

Cognitive-cultural integration


Cognitive-cultural integration results from language acquisition as well as from an awareness of the traditions and informal rules of the host society. Language skills are crucial for integration: They serve as a prerequisite for coping with everyday life and building social relationships, as well as for employment and participation in education. In the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey, refugees have been asked annually since 2016 how well they can speak, write and read German. There is a consistently positive trend here (see Figure 42).

However, a flattening of the learning curve in general language acquisition is also apparent.¹³⁴ In 2019, 50 percent of respondents rated their language skills as "very good" or "good," six percentage points higher than in 2018. This percentage increased by only one percentage point in 2020. Similarly, the percentage of respondents rating their writing skills as "very good" or "good" increased from 41 percent in 2018 to 47 percent in 2019. In the following year, this number grew by only two percentage points. Meanwhile, the share of refugees who rated their reading skills as "very good" or "good" increased by six percentage points year-over-year in 2020. Nonetheless, in summary, overall language acquisition slowed in 2020.

Furthermore, there are differences between different subgroups of refugees when it comes to

134 See Niehues (2022). Fünfte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Entwicklung der Deutschkenntnisse, Sorgen und Lebenszufriedenheit bei Geflüchteten während des ersten Covid-19-Pandemiejahres, Nürnberg.

Figure 41:
Attitudes of the German host society towards different social relations with refugees



Note: Values below five percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: Own illustration from data of the Special Eurobarometer: integration of immigrants in the European Union. Question: "Would you personally feel comfortable or uncomfortable if you had an immigrant friend, family member, neighbour, work colleague?"

acquiring German language skills.¹³⁵ Male refugees rate their German language skills higher than female refugees do. Female refugees with children under the age of four in particular rate their German language skills as low compared to other refugees. German language skills also differ across age groups. In 2020, refugees aged 51 and older estimated their German language skills to be lower than refugees aged 31 to 50 did. According to their own assessment, refugees between the ages of 18 and 30 have the highest German language skills. Furthermore, German language skills vary depending on refugees' educational background. Refugees with a higher level of education report higher German language skills than refugees with a medium or low level of education.

Educational participation indicates the proportion of refugees who were in education within


the period under consideration, i.e., either attending school or university (including doctoral studies), undergoing vocational training, or participating in continuing education. Between 2016 and 2018, the educational participation of refugees increased, but from 2018, a slightly negative trend has been observed (see Figure 43). One noticeable fact is that women refugees' participation in education is significantly lower than that of their male counterparts. This could be because female refugees are often responsible for household chores and childcare.¹³⁶ Between 2018 and 2019, female participation in education had declined by one percentage point. In 2020, on the other hand, female participation in education increased by nine percentage points and is thus back at the same level as in 2018.

The cognitive-cultural integration of refugees is facilitated in Germany by the provision of integration courses. The aim of these courses is to

135 See Niehues (2022). Fünfte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Entwicklung der Deutschkenntnisse, Sorgen und Lebenszufriedenheit bei Geflüchteten während des ersten Covid-19-Pandemiejahres, Nürnberg.

136 See Kosyakova et al. (2021). Geflüchtete Frauen müssen viele Hindernisse überwinden, Nuremberg.

Figure 42:
Assessment of German language skills according to the categories speaking, writing and reading



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N=1,260 to 4,335.

provide refugees with the skills they need to cope independently with everyday life in Germany. They teach language skills as well as basic knowledge about the legal system, culture and history of Germany.¹³⁷ Previous analyses show that refugees who arrived between 2013 and 2016 attended targeted integration courses.¹³⁸

During the COVID-19 pandemic, these courses took place online to avoid disruption of classes during lockdown periods, so the interaction dur-


ing this period was also online.¹³⁹ Digital learning during the pandemic had varying effects on course participants. Participants with a high level of education and good language skills perceived this as beneficial, as virtual learning gave them the autonomy to learn. In addition, group work was easier to organize than in face-to-face classes; independent communication in German and the active participation of participants also increased. On the other hand, digital learning was a challenge for participants with a low level of education and language skills. According to the teachers' assessment, these participants' learning autonomy tends to be negatively impacted because they often have to rely on others to help them find their way around digital resources. A clear disadvantage of digital learning in the integration process is that without face-to-

137 See Kay et al. (2021). Digitales Lehren und Lernen im Integrationskurs: Herausforderungen und Potenziale aus der Sicht der Lehrkräfte, Nürnberg.

138 See Niehues (2022). Fünfte Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: Entwicklung der Deutschkenntnisse, Sorgen und Lebenszufriedenheit bei Geflüchteten während des ersten Covid-19-Pandemiejahres, Nürnberg.

139 See Kay et al. (2021). Digitales Lehren und Lernen im Integrationskurs: Herausforderungen und Potenziale aus der Sicht der Lehrkräfte, Nürnberg.

Figure 43:
Development of participation in education by gender



Note: "Are you currently in training? That means: Are you attending school or college, including doctoral studies, are you in vocational training, or are you attending a continuing education course?" (N=1,227 to 3,892). The answer category "Yes" is shown.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted.

face teaching, the social-integrative effect of the integration courses is weakened because there is no personal contact before and after the lessons. This is the time when personal relationships are formed and experiences are shared.¹⁴⁰

Social integration


Social integration occurs through contact between the host society and refugees. It refers to the social relationships between refugees and people in the host society, as well as the integration of refugees into networks. Frequent contact between refugees and the host society reduces reservations and can have a positive effect on the integration climate.¹⁴¹

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey examines the social integration of refugees by asking how often refugees spend time with Germans. A positive trend was observable from 2016 up to and including 2019 (see Figure 44). The percentage of respondents spending time with Germans "every day" increased by six percentage points between 2017 and 2019. At the same time, the percentage of respondents who "never" spend time with Germans decreased by three percentage points. In 2020, a decrease in time spent with Germans was observed for the first time. The percentage of respondents who spend time with Germans "every day" decreased by eight percentage points between 2019 and 2020. In 2020, 23 percent of respondents "never" spent time with Germans, increasing their percentage by three percentage points year-on-year. Thus, restrictions on social contact in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic measures also impacted the integration of refugees in 2020.

140 See Kay et al. (2021). Digitales Lehren und Lernen im Integrationskurs: Herausforderungen und Potenziale aus der Sicht der Lehrkräfte, Nürnberg.

141 See SVR-Migration (2020). Zusammenrücken in Zeiten der Distanz. SVR Integration Barometer 2020, Berlin.

Figure 44:
Time spent with Germans



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N=1,261 to 5,552, question "How often do you spend time with Germans?"

9%

OF REFUGEE WOMEN
ARE DOING AN APPRENTICESHIP.

23%

THE RESPONDENTS WHO
"NEVER" SPENT TIME WITH GERMANS IN 2020.

70%

OF REFUGEE WOMEN
"NEVER" SPEND TIME WITH GERMAN
PEOPLE IN THE WORKPLACE.

In 2020, clear gender differences are evident in terms of contact with the host society. Refugee women spend less time with German individuals at work, in the neighbourhood and among friends. The clearest difference is seen at the workplace. 70 percent of the refugee women "never" spend time with German people at work. This is true for only 39 percent of refugee men (see Figure 45). There appear to be several reasons for these differences: For example, refugee women have poorer German language skills, a lower level of formal education and are less likely to be employed. This makes their social integration more difficult. In addition, refugee women spend a large part of their time caring for children and doing household chores. This leaves less time for them to participate in social life.¹⁴²

142 See De Paiva Lareiro et al. (2021). Geflüchtete Frauen in Deutschland: Freizeitverhalten und soziale Kontakte, Nuremberg.

Initial insights into the integration of refugees from Ukraine


In 2022, more than one million refugees from Ukraine arrived in Germany as a result of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine. 80 percent of the adult refugees are women.¹⁴³ Most of them came to Germany without a partner. An IAB research report, in which 11,225 adult refugees from Ukraine were interviewed, has been taken into account for an assessment of the identificational, cognitive-cultural and social integration of the refugees from Ukraine.¹⁴⁴

Recent studies have found a pronounced sympathy and willingness to help on the part of the

143 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

144 See Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben, Nürnberg.

Figure 45:
Contact with Germans in different contexts by gender



Note: Values below four percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2020, weighted, N=1,261.

German population for refugees from Ukraine.¹⁴⁵ This is reflected by the Ukrainian refugees: Overall, the majority of refugees feel welcome in Germany: 43 percent of respondents feel "mostly" welcome and 33 percent "fully" welcome. Only seven percent of respondents feel "hardly" welcome in Germany.

As already shown in chapter one, Ukrainian refugees have an above-average level of education. This is true relative to both the German and the Ukrainian population as a whole. The high level of education among refugees from Ukraine has a positive effect on cognitive-cultural integration, as educational attainment is positively statistically related to the likelihood of employment.¹⁴⁶

The language skills of refugees from Ukraine are important for cognitive-cultural integration. About 83 percent of the respondents rate their German language skills as "low." Moreover, only three percent of the respondents rate their German language skills as "high" (see Figure 46). Nevertheless, 51 percent of respondents were attending a German course or had already completed one at the time of the survey. Language course attendance increases with length of stay and intention to stay.

The frequency of contact between refugees from Ukraine and the host society is a measure of social integration. About 44 percent of refugees from Ukraine spend time with Germans "several times a week" or "daily," while 41 percent of respondents do so "weekly or less often" (see Figure 47). Only 15 percent of respondents said they "never" spend time with Germans. The frequency of contact increases with good German language skills and employment. In addition, refugees from Ukraine who attend school or are housed in private accommodation spend more time with people from the host society.

Moving into a private apartment also increases the sense of belonging in society and is essential for social integration.¹⁴⁷ At the time of the survey 74 percent of respondents lived in private apartments. About 60 percent of them lived there alone. About 25 percent lived with friends, acquaintances or family members already living in Germany. Fifteen percent of respondents lived with other people.¹⁴⁸

The pronounced sympathy and helpfulness of the German population for the refugees from Ukraine, the relatively high level of education of the Ukrainian refugees, as well as the relatively high frequency of contact between refugees from Ukraine and Germans attest to successful integration. However, acquiring a good knowledge of German is a particularly important step for successful integration.

147 See Malteser Migration Report 2019, Cologne.

148 See Brücker et al. (2022). *Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben*, Nürnberg.

145 See SVR-Migration (2022). *Integrationsklima 2022: Leicht verbessert mit einzelnen Eintrübungen*, Berlin.

146 See Brücker et al. (2022). *Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben*, Nürnberg.


80%

OF ADULT REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE
ARE WOMEN.

74%


OF RESPONDENTS LIVE IN
PRIVATE HOMES.

Figure 46:
Self-assessment by Ukrainian refugees of
their German language skills



Source: Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben.

Figure 47:
Time spent by Ukrainian refugees with Germans



Source: Brücker et al. (2022). Geflüchtete aus der Ukraine in Deutschland: Flucht, Ankunft und Leben.

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WHAT WE DO: Most of our civil rescue and disaster services, first aid training, the provision of support services to seniors, people with illness or disadvantages, and youth and foreign work we do are based on volunteer work. We also operate social services, such as rescue and emergency medical services, ambulance services, home emergency assistance and food delivery services. The Malteser organization operates hospitals, senior assisted-living facilities, schools and social services for young people, addicts and asylum-seekers.

HOW WE WORK: The Malteser organization today meets its Order's mission it set out to engage in 950 years ago, in a contemporary way that meets the needs of people as well as the societal framework in the most effective manner. All the services and facilities of the Maltese are those of a non-profit organization. What we generate in profits is invested into the maintenance and expansion of our service programs.

“Protecting the Faith and Serving the Sick and the Poor”

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